for their success on the work carried out by the Admiralty Departments responsible for design and production, and apart from this these departments, during the year 1917, carrie

epartment, from the control of the Director of Naval Ordnance, and Rear-Admiral Fitzherbert was appointed as Director of Torpedoes and Mines, with two assistant Directors under him, one for torpedoes and the other for mines. It had for some time been apparent to me that the torpedo and mining work of the Fleet requ

ll aware of the directions in which improvement in armament efficiency was n

aval Ordnance Department during the year 1917, in addition to the provi

than that previously in use; the initial designs for these shells were produ

roduction o

perience in the Jutland action, for preventing the flash o

. With our older pattern of shell, as used by the Fleet at Jutland and in earlier actions, there was no chance of the burst of the shell, when fired at battle range, taking place inboard, after penetrating the side armour of modern German capital ships, in such a position that the fragments might be expected to reach and explode the maga

acturers for the feat which they achieved. We had pressed for a shell of this nature

during one of the short night bombardments of the south coast by German destroyers, some German star shell, unexploded, reached the shore. Directions were at once given to copy these shell and not to waste time by trying to improve upon them, a procedure dear to t

with which the Fleet had been equipped as the result of certain of our ships being blown up in the Jutland ac

e new pattern mine and arranging for its production in great numbers, in overcoming the difficulties experienced with the

w organization involving the appointmen

ried out at that time by the Third Sea Lord should be transferred to a civilian. At first it was understood by us that the idea was to re-institute the office of additional Civil Lord, which office was at the time held by Si

rd of Trade or the Shipping Controller, one reason being that the supply of labour and material, which were very important factors, was a matter of competition between the claims of the Navy and those of the Mercantile Marine, and another the fact that many men had been withdrawn from the shipyards for service in the Army. There was especial difficulty in providing labour for the manufacture of machinery, and at one time the Admiralty went so far as to lend artificers to assist in the production of engines. The idea of placing the production of ships for both services under one head appealed to and was supported by the Admiralty. The next step

rough without the strong support of the Commander-in-Chief; for this reason he considered he must be assured of my support at the Admiralty. In view of the importance attached to combining under one administration the work of both naval and mercantile shipbuilding for the reasons already stated, and influenced in some deg

, torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the Controller became entirely responsible for production. It was obvious that goodwill and tact would be required to start this new organization, which was decidedly complicated, and that the post of Third Sea Lord would be difficult to fill. At the request of Sir Eric Geddes Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B., who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord, was asked

had temptations in his path, especially under war conditions, to make inspection subservient to rapidity of production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objections. He informed me that he based his arguments largely on his experience at the Ministry of Munitions, with which he had been associated earlier in the war. The contention of the naval officers at the Admiralty was that even if the organization proposed was found to be workable for the Army, it would not be satisfactory for the Navy, as in our case it was essential that the responsibility for approval of design and for inspection should be independent of the producer, whether the producer was a Government official or a contractor. Apart from questions of general principle

ating to the efficiency of its material is of such paramount importance to the fighting efficienc

was felt that the increase in staff, though it involved, of course, very heavy expenditure, would be justified if it resulted in increased rapidity of production. It will be readily understood that such an immense change in organization, one which I had promised to see through personally, and which was naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty dep

re, I bore a large share of responsibility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted with naval needs by one in which a considerable proportion of the personnel had no previous experience of the work. The change was, of course,

esults under the old Admiralty organization compared with those under the ne

P PROD

rtments of the Director of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which dealt with the design and production of gun

under a Deputy Controller, the Third Sea Lord having no authority

in-Chief of the Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion of all warships under construction. My expe

three ahead of the forecast. Of thirteen "E" class submarines forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except two were delivered by April; of twelve "K" class submarines forecasted

of the thirty would be delivered during that period. There was also some delay in the delivery of twin screw minesweepers, twenty of which were shown in the forecast of October, 1916, as due for delivery in the first six months of 19

do not necessarily mean that the rate of production is satisfactory, but only that the forecast is to be depended on. We were never at all satisfied with the rate of production, either un

table below shows the forecasts ("F") given in June, 1917, and the deliveries ("D") of diff

----------------------

Aug. | Sept. | Oct.

| D | F | D | F |

----------------------

| | | | |

| | | |

2 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 5

| 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 |

5 | 2 | 4 | 2 |

| 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 |

----------------------

were classed as auxili

Aug. | Sept. | Oct.

| D | F | D | F |

----------------------

3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1

|23 |14 |30 |13 |

----------------------

e even for the three succeeding months and that the total deficit in the f

to submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The cas

dates of three, however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, only nine were actually delivered. Of the r

h was arising. In the early part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was obviously impossible for the Naval Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could be

at the head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for Dockyards and Shipbuilding, and the Director of Warship Production was a distinguished Naval constructor. The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbui

6 the new building programme, which had receiv

leaders. 50

's. 60 Su

4 Seaplan

eepers. 60 Boom

Pad

menace, as well as to substitute 115 drifters for 50 of the trawlers, and to request the Canadian Government to build 36 trawlers and 100 drifters mainly for use in Canadian waters. It was also decided to lay down 36 m

la lea

.D.

ol b

ops

epers (

addl

win-screw mi

arin

lers

ters

an tra

ifte

fence v

le decoy

ne car

gs

skim

ruisers as to jeopardize our supremacy in this class of vessel, and it was decided by the Board that we ought to build e

substitute eighteen additional "H" class submarines for four of the "L" class, as the vessels of the "H" class were capable of more rapid construction, thus making the total number o

class of cruisers as a seaplane vessel in order to obtain an increased number of vessels of this type more rapidly than by buildin

ILE SHI

struction under the Admiralty Controller instead of under the Ministry of Shipping. It was expected that the difficulties

iew of the situation hopes were held out that during the second half of 1917 an addition of about 1,000,000 tons of shipping from the shipyard

arded the estimate as very optimistic. Further, it was anticipated by the then Admiralty Controller, Sir Eric Geddes, that during the year 1918, with some addition to the labour strength, a total output of nearly two million tons was possible, pro

al output for the second half of the year was only 620,000 ton

46,929 J

8,436 Augu

654 Septem

536 Octob

3 Novembe

397 Decem

of Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding. The subsequent results in the direction of output of merchant ships do not properly come within the scope of

8,568 Jul

00,038 Aug

674 Septem

,533 Octo

74 Novemb

159 Decem

the year

1917, the exact figure for that year being 1,163,474 tons; these results,

ILE REP

e arrangements for the repair of merchant ships. This is shown by an analysis

000. There remained under repair at the end of August 326 ships, and at the end of November 350 ships, these figures indicating tha

s successful acceleration of repair work which natur

NT PRO

such matters on a large scale than are military officers, except perhaps officers in the Artillery and Royal Engineers. Whatever may be the case in the future, the Navy in pre-war days was so much more dependent on material than the Army as to make questions relating to naval material of far greater importance that was the case with military material. This fac

ect gave rise to a good deal of misconception. The fact that it had been necessary to form a separate Ministry (that of Munitions) to deal with

production of guns, gun-mountings, projectiles, cordite, torpedoes, mines, paravanes and all other war material was placed u

n during 1917, and during the latter part of the year I was much concerned with the delay

mines as were on order, and although a large organization for their production was started by Sir Lionel Halsey, when Fourth Sea Lord, with the assistance of Admiral Fitzherbert and

s years without taking the above fact into account, we might form an incorrect impression as to the success of the organization for production. For instance, in the last quarter of 1917, 1,515 guns of all calibres were delivered, as against 1,101 in the first quarter; in the month of November 1,335 mines of all natures

ed the distribution of all steel for all services and produced a very beneficial effect on the issue of supplies of steel to shipbuilders. The immense increase in staff