object of being able to deal more effectively with the submarine warfare against merchant ships. Mention has also been made of the

in H.T. Walwyn took the place of Captain Dreyer on March 1, 1917, when the latter officer became Director of Naval Ordnance. When Admiral Duff was appointed Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with a seat on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., became head of the division, which still remained one of the divisions of the Staff working immediately under the A.C.N.S. It is to these officers, with their most zealous, clever and efficient staff, that the institution of many of the successful anti-submarine measures is largely due. They were indefatigable in their s

my duty to mention it here since I am better able to speak of it than any other person. In saying this I do not wish to detract in the least from the value

ed in December, 1916, the earlier devi

shell fitted to explode some 40 to 60 feet under wa

for use against submarines than that supplied at

supply of smoke apparatus for the screening of me

er of depth charges supplied to

one for anti-submarine work, both

Otter" for the protection of

t in the rapidity of arming

anized use of air craft

ent of the special s

m of net protection for mercha

ast coastal motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production of mines of an improved type for use especially against submarines, very considerable developments in the use of minefields, especially deep minefields, including persistent mining in the Heligoland Bight and the laying of a complete minefield at varying depths in the Straits of Dover; also, after the United States entered the

ed out of the North Sea was taken in hand by organized hunting operations by destroyers and other pat

ol of mercantile traffic, and much was done to train the personnel

it will be of interest to examine

ITZ

e number of bomb-throwers and howitzers on order had been increased to 2,056, of eight different patterns. Over 1,000 of these weapons fired a bomb or shell carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs. in weight, and with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards. Later in the war, as we gained experience of the value of this form of attack, heavier bombs were introduced for use in the existing bomb-throwers and howitzers. The how

eared certain to hit the ship. A projectile fired from the howitzer exploded under water close to the torpedo, deflected it from its course, and caused it to come to the surface

mmenced in June, 1917, a

comp

itzers inc

lly issued.

4, 191

1, 191

10, 191

re, which is shown by these figures gives some idea of

OR USE AGAIN

ials against a target representing the hull of a German submarine, so far as the details were known to us, to ascertain the most

ions of service. The trials were therefore continued, and as a result, in June, 1917, a further order was issued to the Fleet, giving directions as to the type of projectile to be used against submarines from all natures of guns, pending the introduction of delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the temporary solution of the difficulty until a new type of shell evolved from t

APPA

supply to merchant ships was d

rework composition and other chemicals were used. A dense smoke cloud was thus formed, and, with the wind in a suitable directi

was thrown overboard and for

he smoke apparatus to ships is

1917 -

1917 - 2

, 1917 -

6, 1917 -

H CH

d, or to supply all trawlers and other patrol craft with their allowance. The great value of the depth charge as a weapon against submarines, and the large number that were required for successful attack, became apparent early in 1917, and the allowance was increased. Difficulty was experienced throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks owing to the shortage of labour and the many demands on our indus

f firing at much greater depths than had been in use before. The result was that all vessels, whether fast or slow, could safely use th

y good results were obtained from their use when destroyers carried enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the assumed position at which the submar

sapprehension as to the value of dep

charge near the submarine in order to effect destruction. Taking the depth charge with 300 lb. weight of explosive, ordinarily supplied to destroyers in 1917, it was necessary to explode it within fourteen feet of a submarine to ensure destruction; at distances up to about twenty-eight feet

submarine with depth charges to drop them in very close proximity, and the first obvious d

to the submarine at the moment of the latter diving the

ROP

e patrol vessels had been fitted with hydrophones, which had a listening range of one or two miles, all the devices for use afloat suffered from the disadvantage that it was not possible to use them whilst the ship carrying them was moving, since the noise of the vessel's own machinery and of the water passing along the side prevented the noise made by other vessels being located. What was required was a listenin

ed and which gave some indication of the direction of the sound; finally, in the summer of 1917, the ability and patience of one inventor, Mr. Nash, were rewarded, and an instrument was devised termed the "fish" hydrophone which to a considerable extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr. Nash, whose invention had been considered but not

destroyers, "P" boats and motor launches, to enter and train men to work it, and finally to organ

m, proceeded as rapidly as the vessels could be obtained, but largely owing to the slow production of trawlers it was not until November that the first hunting flotilla fitted with the "fish" hydrophone was actually at work. The progress made after this date is illustrated by the fact that in December, 1917, a division of drifters, with a "P" boat, fitted with this "fish" hydrophone hunted an enemy submarine for seven hours during darkness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept touch with her by sound throughout this period, and finished by dropp

depth charge on an oil patch, and shortly afterwards one of the hydrophones picked up the sound of an internal combustion engine; a line of depth charges was run on the bearing indicated by the hydrophone. The motor launches and the destroyer remained listening, until at about 6.0 P.M. a submarine came to the surface not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two rounds at the submarine before the latter submerged. Other motor launches closed in, and depth charges were dropped by them in close proximity to the wash of the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more dep

oon as its utility was established, and were supplied with depth charges. In the summer of 1917 four such hunting flotillas were busy in the Channel;

8, as the numbers of ships fitted with the "fish" and oth

of hydrophones is shown

of Dire

rvice Mark I an

e Type. Mark

2,750

2,750

2,750

3,500 1

,680 1,9

ATIONS AND TR

more were nearing completion. The first step necessary was a considerable increase in the instructional facilities for training listener

of the number of officers and men who were instructed in hydrophone work either at Hawkcraig or at other stations by instructors sent from Hawkcraig, but the total was certainly upwards of 1,000 officers and 2,000 men.

ing 1915, and in 1916 a section of the Board of Invention and Research went to Hawkcraig to work in conjunction with him. This station produced the Mark II directional hydrophone of which large numbers were ordered in 1917 for use in pa

tablished near Harwich in January, 1917. The Mark I directional hydrophone was designed at this establishment

nd good work was done both there and at a hydrophone station established to the southward of Otranto at a

" AND P

nst its general adoption, partly on account of the difficulties experienced in its early days of development, and partly owing to the extensive outlay involved in fitting all ships. However, this opposition was eventually overcome, and before the end of the war the system had very amply justified itself by saving a large number of warships from destruction by mines

in all difficulties were overcome, and the rate of progress in its use is shown in the following

5 ships had

, 294 ships ha

, 900 ships h

n merchant ships, and supplies of "Ott

were known to have been saved from destr

RMING OF ME

, from Japan, and from France, besides surrendering some guns from the secondary and anti-torpedo boat armament of our own men-of-war, principally those of the older type, pending the manufacture of large numbers of guns for the purpose. Orders for some 4,200 guns were placed by Captain Dreyer, the Director of Naval Ordnance, with our own gun mak

ime brought the total number of guns and howitzers under manufacture in England for

the commencement of the war (excluding those which were working under the White Ensign

last six months of that year a further total of 1,406 ships were provided with guns, an aggregate number

work is shown by t

guns tha

ded for Bri

cluding

1, 191

1, 191

, 1917

1, 191

1, 191

ounted in ships that were lost throu

shown that smaller weapons were usually outranged by those carried in submarines, and the projectiles of even the 12-pounder were sm

OR ANTI-SU

work. Closer co-operation between surface vessels and aircraft was also secured, and as the convoy system was extended aircraft were used both for escort and observation work, as well as for attack on submarines. For actual escor

from the coast, and such aircraft as we possessed did not carry sufficiently powerful bombs to be very effective in attacking submarines, alth

Staff co-operated in the matter of their organization; with the advent of the large "America" type of seaplane and the Handley-Page type of aeroplane, both of w

trumental in adding greatly to their efficiency, and by the early summer of 1917 aircraft had c

ecame rapid, as the f

r anti-submarine operations covered 75,000 miles, sig

ine patrols of aeroplanes and seaplanes was 91,000 mile

e far less favourable flying weather experienced, the mileage covered was again 91,

es again show the increased a

ti-submarine patrol covered 53,000 mi

83,000 miles, and sighted 8 sub

917, they covered 50,000 miles, sighte

han air craft, and the fact that they covered practically the same mileage in the winter days of D

hter than air craft sighted 26 and attacked 15. The figures given in Chapter IX of the number of submarines sunk during the war by ai

capabilities, in view of the enormous demands of the Army, was drawn up by the Nav

nd heavy bombing machines for attacking enemy bases, as well as othe

were the bombing attacks on Bruges, since the German submarines an

7 the Naval Air Forces of the Dover Command, which included the squadrons at Dunkirk, were under the command of Cap

ible. These machines were generally used for night bombing, and the weight of bombs dropped on the enemy bases in Belgium rose with great rapidity as machines of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as did the number of nights on which attacks were made. It was no uncom

RVICE OR D

onths of 1917 it was decided to augment greatly the force of these special service vessels, and steps were taken to organize a separate Admiralty Department for the work. Special experience was needed, both for the selection of suitable ships and for fitting them out, and care was taken to select officers who had been personally connected with the work during the war; the advice of successful commanders of decoy ships was also utilized. At the head was Captain Alexander Farrington, under whose directions several ships had been fitted out at Scapa with great ingenuity and success. Every class of ship was brought into the service: ste

P" class of patrol boats then under construction could be altered to work as decoy ves

close examination owing, again, to their fine lines, but being better sea boats than the "P's," by reason of their greater freeboard, the design was continued, and they met with considerable success against sub

ike to coming to the surface sufficiently close to merchant ships to admit of the gun armament being used with certainty of success. A torpedo, on the other hand, could, of course, be used effectively against a submarine whilst still su

ously made an attack upon her. In all cases of disguise or of changing disguise it was essential that the decoy ship should assume the identity of some cla

e examination through the periscope of a submarine. German submarine commanders, after a short experience of decoy ships, were most careful not to bring their vessels to the surface in proximity to craft that were apparently m

o think that his attack had succeeded, precautions had to be taken against the presence of more than the ordinary number of men in the boats lowered and sent away with the supposed whole ship's company; also

t to justify any further addition to existing numbers in view of the increasing shortage of shipping; a considerable fleet of steamers building for this purpose was therefore diverted to trade

the splendid gallantry, self-sacrifice, skilful resource and magnificent discipline shown by t

p armed with five 12-pounder guns, commanded by that most gallant officer, Captain Gordon

yards, and she came slowly past the ship still submerged and evidently examining the vessel closely through the periscope. She passed within a few yards of the ship, then crossed the bow and came to the surface about 200 yards off and passed down the port side again close to. Captain Campbell waited until every gun would bear before giving the signal for "action." The decoy ship's true character was then revealed; concealed gunports were thrown open; colours were hoisted, and a hot fire opened from all guns. The submarine was hit at once and continued to be hit so rapidly that it was evidently impossible for her to submerge. She sank in a very short time. One officer and

at a range of about 4,000 yards. The fire was accurate and the decoy ship was hit frequently, two men being killed and four wounded in a few minutes and the vessel considerably damaged. As further concealment appeared useless the guns were then unmasked and the fire returned with apparently goo

.44 N., Long. 11.42 W., a submarine about two miles away on the port beam at 8.30 P.M. At 8.45 P.M. the submarine opened fire on the Prize and the "abandon ship" party left in a small boat. The submarine gradually approac

as the submarine moved away, and after an interval she appeared to be on fire and to sink. This occurred shortly after 9.0 P.M., when it was nearly dark. The Prize sent her boats to pick up survivors, three being taken out of the water, including the commander and one other officer. The prisoners on coming on board expressed their willingness to assist in taking the Prize into port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would long remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seamanship the leaks were got under to a sufficient extent to allow of the ship being kept afloat by pumping. The prisoners gave considerable help, especially when the ship caught fire whilst starting the motor again. On May 2 she met a motor launch off the coast of Ireland and was towed into port. In spite of the undoubted great damage to the submarine, damage confirmed by the survivors, wh

in the action. It was sad that so fine a commander and so splendid a ship's company should have been lost a little later in action with another submarine wh

919 to unveil a memorial to the gallant Sanders which w

orpedo also blew one of the boats to pieces. The usual procedure of abandoning ship was carried out, and shortly after the boats had left, the periscope of a submarine was sighted steering for the port side. The submarine passed close under the stern, steered to the starboard side, then recrossed the stern to the port side, and when she was some fifty yards off on the port beam her conning tower appeared on the surface and she steered

bell in withholding his fire although his ship was so seriously damaged. The gallantry and fine discipline of the ship's company, th

the Glen. The usual practice of abandoning ship was followed, the submarine closing during this operation to within half a mile and remaining at that distance examining the Glen for some time. After about half an hour she went ahead and submerged, and then passed round the ship at about 200 yards distance, examining her through the periscope, finally comi

raint shown by the commanding officer of the

V.C., R.N., sighted a submarine on the surface some distance off. The submarine steered towards the ship and submerged, and soon afterwards came to the surface some two miles off and opened f

r gun out of his control station, and wounding severely the seaman stationed at the depth charges. The situation now was that the submarine was passing from the port to the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch magazine and the remaining depth charges in the after part of the Dunraven might be expected to explode. The 4-inch gun's crew aft knew the imminence of this danger, but not a man moved although the deck beneath them was rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain Campbell was so certain of the magnificent discipline and g

en finally abandoned although her true character had been revealed. Meanwhile he had made a wireless signal to other ships to keep away as he still hoped to get the submarine, whi

submerged again soon afterwards, and as she passed the ship Captain Campbell from his submerged tube fired a torpedo at her, which just missed. Probably the range was too short to allow the torpedo to gain its correct depth. She went right round the ship, and a second torpedo was fired from the other tube, which again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the submarine, as she submer

antry, patience and resource, the splendid training and high standard of discipline, which were necessary to success in this form of warfare. Lieutenant Charles G. Bonner, R.N.R., and

success was due to those who worked so magnificently under his command, and he also realized the magnitude of the work perform

under mounted aft. After the shelling had continued for some time the usual order was given to "abandon ship," and a little later the periscope of the submarine was sighted some distance away. The submarine gradually closed, keeping submerged, until within about a quarter of a mile, when she passed slowly round the ship, and finally came to the sur

L GUN

scorting merchant ships through the submarine zone, arrangements were made to build a larger and faster class of trawler which would be suitable for convoy work under favourable conditions, and which to a certain extent would take the place of de

was delivered during 1917 instead of the twenty or so which had been promised, whilst I believe that by July, 1918, not more than fourteen had been completed instead of the anticipated number of forty. I was informed that they proved to be a most usef

ION FOR MER

aeon Torpedo School ship. Experiments were carried out by a battleship at Rosyth

ea, and he introduced modifications, with the result that later in the year 1917 directions were given for fresh trials to be undertaken. At the end of the year success was first obtained, and this was confirmed early in 1918, and the device finally adopted. A c

HARGE T

srs. Thornycroft, of Southampton, were tried and gave good results. The arrangement was one by which depth charges could be projected to a distance of 40 yards from a vessel, and the throwers were usually fitted

tried orders were placed for large numbers

commenced i

1, 30 had b

, 97 had bee

1, 238 had b

L MOTO

n built to carry out certain operations in the Heligoland Bight, working from Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance whic

e useful for anti-submarine work. A large number were ordered, some for anti-submarine work and some for certain contemplated operations in enemy waters, including a night attack on the enemy's light cruisers known to lie occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was intended to carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight operation in this neighbourhood, which was carried out during 1918, did not, from the pub

G OPE

d Bight rendered necessary such extensive sweeping operations before any portion of the High Sea Fleet could put to sea as to be very useful in giving us some indication of any movement that might be intended. In view of the distance of t

es had laid minefields in some portions of the Bight, and it was necessary for our minelayers to give such suspected areas a wide berth. Secondly, it was obvious that

nd Bight, the position in which our mines were laid was never known with absolute accuracy. Consequently an area in which we had directed mines

ice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, was of great help in ensuring accuracy in laying minefi

operations of German minesweepers and mine-bumpers more difficult and hazardous as they had to work farther out, thus giving our light forces better chances of catching them at work and engaging them. Such actions as that on November 17, 1917, between our light forces

eligoland Bight as to force enemy submarines and other vessels to ma

med dangerous. In this respect German and British methods may be contrasted: We never laid a minefield which could possibly have been dangerous to neutrals without issuing a warning stating that a certain area (which included the minefield) was dangerous. The Germans never issued such a warning unless the proclamation stating that half the Atlantic Ocean, most of the North Sea, and nine-tenths of the Mediterran

voted much of his time to mining devices, by which mines some distance below the

icy. Its executi

A percentage only of our mines exploded when hit by a submarine, and they failed sometimes to

tter defect, but it took time and but few mines wer

aying efforts is shown

id Deep

eligoland off

catch su

4,4

1,679

rter of 1

er of 1917 6

rter of 1

an coast we laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915, 9,68

alterations, made with a view to increas

e first trials, the success was sufficient to warrant the placing of orders for 100,000 mines and in making arrangements for the quickest possible manufacture. This

ight and were immediately successful against enemy submarines. More were laid in the Bight during October, November and December, and the remainder, as they were produced, were pre

In October 2,350, November 5,300, December 4,800; total 12,450. So that

ns during the year 1917 made it necessary also to a

emy waters during the period near full moon owing to the liability of the minelayers being seen by patrol craft. Under such conditions the position of the minefield would be known to the enemy. As the operation of placing the mines on board o

"Ariadne" class, and although their machinery was not too reliable, two of these vessels that were seaworthy were converted to minelayers. In addition a number of the older light cruisers were fitted with portable rails on which mines could be carried when min

were ordered, and some of the motor launches and coastal motor boats were fitted o

and several other vessels were in hand for the same purpose. The detailed plans of the arrangements were prepared and the work of fitting out minelayers carried out under the supervis

United States Navy produced a reliable type of mine the idea of placing a mine barrage across the northern part of the North Sea which had been previously discussed became a matter of practical politics. With this end in view a still further addition to the

age of the very large number, some 120,000, required for the northern barrage. The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took this

n barrage were located at Grangemouth, near Leith, where Rear-Admiral Clinton Baker was in charge, as well as in other pl

cts in both British and United States mines which made themselves apparent when the operations commenced, due partly to the great depth of water as well as to other causes, a delay of several months took place; and, even when near completion, the ba

AR

The flares were not much used, however, from kite balloons owing to lack of opportunity, but trials which were carried out with flares from patrol craft, such as trawlers and drifters, demonstrated that they would be of value from these vessels,

commenced, and during 1918 the flares were

L SUBMARI

uring 1917. It was brought to perfection in the late autumn, and orders were given to fit it in certain localities. Some difficulty wa

AGAINST

r craft available was insufficient for any extended method of attack. Early in 1917, when our mercantile losses were very heavy, some submarines were withdrawn from the Harwich and Humber districts and formed into a flotilla off the coast of Ireland for this form of operation. Some risk had to be accepted in thus reducing our

y much frequented by enemy submarines on passage. Still later some submarines were attached to the Portsmouth Command, where, working under Sir Stanley Colville, they had some striking successes; others went to the Dover Command. The latter were fitted with occulting lights on top of the conning-tower, and were moored at night to buoys in the Dove

with previous years; the number of vessels sunk does not, however, convey a complete appreciation of the effect of this form of anti-submarine warfare. The great value of it lay in the feeling of insecurity that it bred in the minds of the enemy submarine commanders. The moral effect of the constant apprehension that one is bein

off a successful attack on a submarine that had been sighted, the low underwater speed of submarines making it d

o design a special type of submarine for this form of warfare, and

d not be complete without mention of the work of the Trade Division of the

ither partly or who

rapidity of placing the arma

of instruction for captains and o

, and its benefit in assisting officers to handle their ships in the manner best calculated to save them from submarine attack so great, that the Admiralty was continually being pressed by shipowners and by the

the Mercantile Marine. This was another matter taken

vited to go through a course of drill, and large numbers responded

e Trade Division was constantly employed, which included all blockade

of visits to ships by officer instructors for the purpose of affording instruction and for inspection, as well as for the purpose of lecturing, was instituted, and arrangements were

ers

cers

s and apprentic

nery co

ant seamen trai

tal Pala

isited by officer

ending thes

ers

cers

and men instructed

interesting scenes witnessed a large number of men of the merchant service at gun drill. I questioned several of them as to their experiences, and many of the men had had their ships torpedoed under them three, four or five times. Amongst the gun crews was a

I knew would result from increased production of anti-submarine vessels and weapons, led me in February, 1918, to state that in my opinion the submarine menace would be "held" by the autumn of the y