The Crisis of the Naval War

ous of the extreme gravity of the situation which developed during the Great War, w

of the supreme crisis in our history might have tended to undermine in some quarters that confidence in victory which it was essential should be main

creasing oversea military liabilities which we were steadily incurring, over and above the responsibility of bringing to these shores the greater part of the food for a population of forty-five million people, as w

een imperilled, but this country would have been brought face to face with conditions approaching starvation. In pre-war days the possibility of these islands being blockaded was frequently discussed; but during the dark days of the unrestricted submarine campaign there was ample excuse for those with imagination to picture the implication of events which were happening from week to week. The memories of those days are already bec

adiness to move in waters which might be infested by submarines in large numbers should the Germans decide upon some operation by the High

ips, required a considerable force of destroyers and other small craft. These commitments greatly reduced the means at our dispo

t to fulfil its new mission. In effect those responsible for the naval policy of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the one on the surface, and the other under the surface. The strategy, tactics and weapons which were appropriate to the former, were to a large extent useless in the contest against mines and submarines which the enemy employed with the utmost persistency and no little ingenuity. Even in the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was little used, it exerted a marked influence on the course of the war; the Germans based their hopes of victory in the early days of the struggle entirely on a war of attrition, waged against men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The submarin

tack and from submarine-laid mines were comparatively slight, and, in fact, less than during the latter half of 1915, but in the autumn of 1916 they assumed very serious proportions. This will be seen b

12

111

110

st 1

mber

er 35

ber 3

truction. These facts, combined with the knowledge that our reserves of food and essential raw materials for war purposes were very low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet, to the inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate all our naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine menace, and to adopt the most energetic measures for the protection of our sea communications and the destruction of the enemy's submarines. Although

t time formed and expressed the view that there was very little probability of the High Sea Fleet putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new submarine campaign had been given a thorough trial. With the High Sea Fleet "in being" we could not afford to deplete the Grand Fleet of destroyers, which could under other conditions be emp

red by all those in authority who were acquainted with

ptance requesting me to meet him in Edinburgh to discuss matters. After consultation with Sir Charles M

ly completed his term of two years in command. I thereupon asked that he might be offered the post of Second Sea Lord, and that Commodore Lionel Halsey, who had been serving as Captain of the Fleet, might be offered that of Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it was very desirable that an officer with the great experience in command possessed by Sir Cecil Burney should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under the conditions which ex

ppointments

ttack of influenza. On that day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only held office under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, a

e extreme cordiality of Sir Edward Carson's relations with the Board in general and myself in particular. His dev

self wholeheartedly into the work. This was before the days of the unrestricted submarine campaign, and although ships were freque

ely armed merchant vessels, and here Sir Edward Carson's assistance was of great value. He fully realized the urgent necessities of the case, a

sity for a considerable strengthening of the Staff. In addition to the newly formed and rapidly expanding Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, he realized that the Operations Division also needed increased s

d to Staff organization that existed at the Admiralty at the en

in an advisory capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed prior to 1904 there were but few naval officers at the Admiralty at all beyond those in the technical departments of the Director of Naval Ordnan

on and Movements Department under a Director. This br

was introduced and a Chief of the War Staff, acting under the First Sea Lord, was appo

F OF

------------------

Director o

ntelligence Division.

on was charged with the responsibility for the suppl

ot of much account during peace, but became of importance in war, and as the war progressed the Chief of the Staff gradually exercised executive functions, orders which were not of the first importance being issued by the Staff in accordance with the policy approved generally by the First Sea Lord. The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie in non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord was

Admiralty experience and worked in the closest co-operation with the naval officers. Their work was of the most

Registry (a part of the Military Branch) directly under t

had, of course, expanded to a very considerable extent to meet war conditions, and a most important Trade Division, which dealt with all questions connected with the Mercantile Marine, had been

aff organization carried out dur

ppear in the Navy List as part of the Staff organization until some months had elapsed, although it started work

ubmarines. This organization is open to the criticism that matters concerning operations and material came under the same head, but they were so closely allied at this stage that it was deemed advisable to accept this departure from correct Staff organization. The personnel of the Division came with me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset consisted of one flag officer-Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B.-two captains,

ussions between Sir Edward Carson and myself the decision was taken that the duties of the Naval Staff (the term decided upon in place of that of War Staff) sho

d with operations against the enemy's surface vessels, and the second with the protection of trade and op

work was styled Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (D.C.N.S.), and the officer connected with the secon

by Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., who was brought down from the Grand Fleet for the purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been Admiral Duff's

and the importance of the question of signal communicatio

aff by the First Sea Lord necessarily made the fun

n at this period is s

N.

D.C.

perations

.

| +-

+--

bilization

Signal

telligence

A.C.

ade Di

nvoys

Submarine

Sweeping

ht compartments, but were to be in the closest touch with one another. The dotted line connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S.

sion were to organize and regulate the movements of convoys of merchant ships. A staff of officers had been by this time sent abroad to the ports from which convoys were direc

of the Staff under the A.C.N.S

C.

----------------

|

ector of Direct

ade Anti-Sub-

vision. mari

in R.N.) Divisio

N.) | (Capt

ff. |

-------

y Mov

on. S

nder the A.C.N.S. comprised the f

ivision, 36 Officers,

icers, with a clerical

ion, 26 Officers, wi

ion, 8 Officers, wi

Submarine Divisions were added during the year 1917, whilst large addition

gth by the appointment of additional officers, charged, under the Director of the Operations Division, with the detailed p

towards a definite conclusion when, to the intense regret of those who had been privileged

arly part of 1917 involved the eventual provision of a great number of additional officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the Second Sea Lord, took this matter in hand with conspicuous success, and the measures which he introduced tided us over a period of much difficult

teps as First Lord which affected Admiralty organization was the appointment of a Deputy First Sea Lord. This appointment was frankly made more as a matter of expediency than because any real need had been shown for the creation of su

erring with the Admiralty before taking up the post of British Commander-in-Chi

further consideration of the question of Admiralty organization. To this end he ap

at the Admiralty, but I also stated that the time had arrived when the whole Admiralty organization should be divided more distinctly into two sides, viz., the Operational side and the Materiél or Administrative side, and indicated that the arrangement existing in the time of

should be kept acquainted with the requirements in the shape of material needed for operations in which the Fleet was engaged-and to the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was assigned this particular liaison duty-I was not in favour of discussing questions affecting ordinary operations with the whole Board, since, in addition to the delay thereby

ans Division as a sub-section in order to avoid overlapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable for a body of officers not working under the authority of those in close touch with the daily operations of the Fleet to put forward plans for operations which necessarily involved

lty, and, secondly, because the Admiralty acted in a sense as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces working in the vicinity of the British Isles. It was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet to assume this function, since he could not be provided with the necessary knowledge without great delay being caused, and, further, when he was at

ritish W

is shown as concisely as poss

MPERIAL GE

of Staf

Organization

ization o

estions of

nd commun

f Military

ns on al

Military I

llig

ion

Pr

Quartermaster-General, the former dealing with all questions relating to the personnel of the Army under the various

the Imperial General Staff. His main duty was to act as a liaison betwee

ffice is, of course, under the direction an

ation at General Hea

D MA

DER-IN

the Gen

ns) Plans and Exec

Duties) War Or

Liason betwee

rative S

l (Personnel, D

neral (Transport

GENERAL HE

STAFF O

-----------------

r Engineer-in-Ch

f Advises as in

tall on A

lery

perat

Admini

rtme

ess

g works in consultation with

e administrative side was maintained by a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in the organi

nor in the case of an Army command does the Chief of the G

the Plans Division separate from the Operations Division by the issue of detailed orders as to the conduct of the business of the Staff, in which directions were given that the

bles A and B on p. 20 below. It was not entirely satisfactory, for reasons already mentioned

BL

d and Chief o

ief of Na

Intelligen

of Signal

f Operatio

rector of

ions a

or Operations Di

ions a

of Plans

ns for operations

f and proposals

terial. Buildi

t approv

First S

Training and

Chief of N

of Trade

Mercantile

of Mine

Anti-Submari

BL

of Adm

ons Com

l St

ance Co

ing and A

or

i

na

and Discip

rk

from the Admiralty, the following

Admiralty makes the f

may be desirable to summarize the changes in the personnel of the Board and t

l George P.W. Hope has been selected for the appointment of Deputy First Sea Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss, but with changed functions. Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Service, leaves the Board

Commons on the 1st November, to the principle of the division of the work of the Board under the two heads of

NS. MAIN

Lord Secon

dmiral Sir

f Naval

Sir Rossl

f Naval Staff.

Fremantle.) (Rear

of Naval Staff.

.L. Duff.) (Rea

hil

t Sea Lord.

W. Hope.) (Right H

.

tro

.G. An

Civil

A.F.

ial Se

T.J. Macna

ent Se

O. Mu

t it may receive the entire attention of the Officers selected for its performance, is now being carried a stage fur

es between the Members of the Board belong

CHIEF Naval policy

STAFF of

F NAVAL War op

F Wa

OF NAVAL Trade

-submarine

LORD General po

ons out

te

onnected with the main operations of the war, and the great mass of important paper work and administrative detail which is inseparably and necessarily connected with St

the Naval Staff Divisions will

Intelligence Division (Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall) and the Director of Training and Staff Dut

ctors whose duties will relate entirely to the planning and dire

tions Division Ca

om

s Division Capta

G.,

ivision Wing Capt

S.

Acting-Captain R.L. Nicholson, D.S.O., whose dut

grouped four Directors, whose duties relate to Tr

Submarine Captain

vi

sweeping Captain

vi

tile Movements Cap

vi

de Division Cap

ll be one Director of Operations Divisio

of great importance and complexity, of which a solution will have to be forthcoming either immediately upon or very soon after the conclusion of the war. The difficulty of concentrating attention on these problems of the future in the midst of current administrative work of great urgency may easily be appreciated, and the Civil Lord has consente

gent naval works in progress have so greatly transformed the functions of the Director of Works Department of the Admiralty that it is desirable,

ngineer, Port Construction, British Armies in France. Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and Company, which built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of Civil En

of securing greater concentration of effort in connection with scientific research and experiment, and ensuring that the distinguished s

ction with the organization of scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also be a member of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the presidency of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions of the Central Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, investigate, develop and advise generally upon proposals i

n of scientific research and experiment will in futur

personnel of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement of their duties and those due to the establishment of an Air Ministry (which had been arranged by the Cabinet before December, 1917), there were but

BL

D AND CHIEF O

ief of Na

of Signal

perations Div

of Plans

of Air

First S

rations Divisio

ative det

Intelligen

Training and

Chief of N

of Trade

Mercantile

of Mine

Anti-Submari

terations in Naval Staff or

reign waters, with a Director of Operations (foreign) under him, and was also definitely charged with the administrative detail involving technical matters. The special gifts,

of there being a Deputy Director for home and an Assistant Director for foreign work, both working under the Di

or of Training and Staff Duties were shown as working immedi

arated from the Admiralty and placed under the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff organization for

nge except that caused by the disappearance of the separate Naval Air Service, the addition of a Second Civil Lord, an

in 1917, owing to the changes in organization initiated in the later year having reached some finality an

in my mind at the end of 1917, was a development of that

works, i.e., that its members are colleagues one of another, and seniority in rank does not, theoretically, give greater weight in council, was not altogether followed. Thus the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were, by the nature of their duties, subo

ord and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in the ab

who should preferably be Flag Officers, with experience in command at sea, having the titles of Dire

t under the hour to hour stress of war to rearrange all the duties of the Naval Staff in the manner m

hat they should be included in the Staff organization, and not "attached" to it as was the case with our Army in pre-war days. The reason for this is that in the Army there is, except in regard to artillery, little "specialization." The t

p an efficient weapon is necessary if the ship is to be used effectively and if operations in which the ship takes so prominent a part are to be suc

ich this specially intimate

tion and of handling ship

Gunn

edoes an

eneral knowledge of each subject, but it is not possible for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all three which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are m

f specialist officers who are attached to it for that purpose. But there is a danger that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of the Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest proc

alists attached to a Staff; but, on the other hand, it is possible that he might not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the opinions o

hat the war has shown that artillery is so all important that it would be desirable to place the Major-Ge

becoming larger than is necessary, and there is some danger t

orff says on

s is moreover vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is absolutely necessary, and by not attaching to every Army,

nnel of the higher Staffs. Finally, it should be remembered-and this is the most weighty argument against the proceeding-that idleness is at the root of all mischief. When there are too many officers on a Staff they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies soon make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways. Experience shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily numerous the ambitious before long take to intrigue, the litigious soon produce general