ht under a system of convoy were those engaged in the French coal

rch, 1917, the steamships engaged in the trade were sa

o Boulogne

lens t

d to Ch

ce to

of the Dover Patrol in the course of their ordinary duties, but for the other t

sailing vessels were also used, and sailed und

vision, in conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, Portsmouth and Plymouth, under whose direction and protection the convoys were run. The immunity of this trade, carried out in the infested waters of the English Channel, from successful attack by submarines was extraordinar

ntries. The particular route in use at any given moment was patrolled by the local forces from the Orkneys and Shetlands, assisted when possible by small craft from the Grand Fleet. The Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed in charge of the arrangements, which were carried out by the Senior Naval Officer at Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands. At this period the intention was that the shipping from Norway should sail at dusk, reach a certain rendezvous at dawn, and thence be escorted to Lerwick. The shipping from Lerwick sailed at dawn under protection, dispersed at dark, and reached the Norwegian coast at dawn. Difficulties, of course, arose in the event of bad weather, or when the slow speed of the ships prevented the passage of about 180 miles being made in approximatel

varying points, and there dispersed, and the destroyers then picked up the west-bound convoy at a rendezvous off the Norwegian coast shortly before dark, and steered for a rendezvous between Norway and the Shetland Islands, where an escort of armed patrol vessels joined the convoy at daylight to assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick convoys were dispatched to various points on the coast of the Unit

the proper protection of the convoys, and to a lesser degree the prov

though they could ill be spared. The total number so utilized was six. It was only possible to provide a force of twenty old destroyers and forty-five trawlers for the East Coast convoys instead of the numbers recommended by the conference, and owing to the age of a large majority of these destroyers and the inevitable resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number available frequently fell below twenty, although it was really marvellous how t

s were made by Sir Frederick Brock for their replacement by more modern vessels before the winter set in. All that could be effected in this direction was done, though at the expense of some of t

enumerated were taken in connecti

the year 1917, and decoy ships occasionally joined the convoys in order to invite submarine attack on themselves. This procedure was indeed adop

y routes in order that they might take advantage of any opportunity to att

es; a second difficulty was the great congestion that took place in that harbour as soon as bad weather set in during the autumn of 1917. The weather during the latter part of 1917 was exceptionally bad, and great congestion and consequen

ributory cause to the increase in the size of convoys was due to the fact that the trade between Lerwick and the White Sea, which had been proceeding direct between those places during the first half of 1917, became the target of persistent submarine attack during the summer, and

ed in March, 1917, as Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, and the whole of the arrangements in regard to the working of the convoys, the issue of orders, etc., from the Norwegian side came under him and his staff, to which additions were made from time to time. The po

the work of controlling the mercantile traffic, and as the orga

r passage without entering harbour. Owing to the overcrowding of Lerwick Harbour the system of changing convoy escorts without entering harbour had been introduced, and the delays due to bad weather were causing great difficulties in

December, 1917, during which period some 6,000 vessels were convoyed

the fourteen or fifteen hours of darkness that prevailed, it will be seen that unless the convoys were actually accompanied by a force sufficient to protect them against operations by surface vessels, there was undoubted risk of successful attack. It was not possible to forecast the class of vessels by which such an attack might be carried out or the strength of the attacking force. The German decision in this respect

t attack on the Scandinavian convoy, no special force of cruisers or light cruisers accompanied the convoy to guard it against attack by surface vessels, although a strong deterrent to attack lay in the frequent presence of forces from the Grand Fle

pt the British and Belgian vessels, which escaped undamaged. The Strongbow, shelled at close range, returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers and sank at about 9.30 A.M. The trawler Elsie effected very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from the Strongbow and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire, and both trawlers reached Lerwick. The enemy sheered off soon after 8.0 A.M. Most unfortunately neither the Strongbow nor the Mary Rose succeeded in getting a wireless signal through to our own vessels to report the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk. We had in the North Sea, during the night before the attack and during the day

impossible to forecast the strength or exact character-battle-cruisers, cruisers or destroyers-of the attack; and the first step was to reduce the number of convoys and to increase correspondingly the number of ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent to the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on October 26 asking whether the convoys could be conveniently reduced to three per week. A reply was received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could be run every third day under certain conditions; the important conditions were the use of the Tyne instead of the Hurnber as a collecting port, and the provision of eigh

e manifest advantages that would result from providing a force for this convoy work that would be additional to the Grand Fleet flotillas. Consideration of the proposals at the Admiralty showed once again the great difficulty of providing the destroyers. It was impossible to spare any from the Mediterranean, where large troop movements needing destroyer protection were in progress, and other Commands were equally unable to furnish them. Indeed, the demands for destroyers from all directions were as insistent as ever. Th

rotection as possible from Grand Fleet resources to

offer great advantages. The conference made recommendations as to the provision of destroyers as soon as they were available, and, amongst other matters, men

he action resulted in the Partridge, the four trawlers, and the whole of the convoy being sunk, and the Pellew was so severely damaged as to be incapable of continuing the action. At the time of this attack a west-bound convoy was at sea to the westward of the other convoy, and two armoured cruisers-the Shannon and Minotaur-with four destroyers were acting as a covering force for the convoys against attack by surface vessels. A wireless signal from the Partridge having been int

ng two convoys at sea at a time, a situation with which the Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The organization then drawn up actually came into effect on January 20, 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, and was continued with certain modifications to the end of the war. The principal modification was an increase of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and later

y which the trade from that country in neutral shipping was controlled enabled the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron to be gradually withdrawn from blockade duties and utilized as ocean convoy cruisers. Even with assistance from the U.S. Navy in the shape of old battleships and cruisers, the use of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the withdrawal of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron of five ships from the Grand

Commander J.S. Wilde, R.N., Lieutenant G.E. Burton, R.N., and Mr. N.A. Leslie, of the Ministry of Shipping.) This committee had before it the experience of an experimental convoy which arrived from Gibraltar shortly after the commenceme

ation at the Admiralty. This organization-termed the Convoy Section of the Trade Division of the Naval Staff-worked directly under Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, who had recently been placed on the Board of Admiralty with the title of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.), and who was in immediate control of the Anti-Submarine, Trade and Minesweeping Divisions of the Staff. Fleet Paymaster H.W.E. Manisty was appointed as Or

s and his staff controlled the assem

ion, both ocean and anti-submarine, was arra

s officer's duties comprised the collection and organization of the convoy and the issue of sailing orders and necessary printed instructions to the masters

he vessel forming the ocean escort, but acted under his orders when in company. The duty of the convoy commodore, whose broad pennant was hois

The duties were most arduous and responsible, but there was no lack of volunteers for this work. Many of the convoy commodores had thei

ening of troop transports through the submarine zone and for the protection of the convoys eastward from the Lizard, the position in which the other screening force left them. We had remaining twelve sloops, which, with trawlers, wer

homeward convoy system. The Admiralty was pressed to weaken yet further the Grand Fleet destroyer force in order

tem it was necessary to take into consideration certain

f sailing. During the latter half of 1917 the general

Frequency of Sai

ery 4 days.

W.

Every 8 days.

8 days. Ei

S.A.) Every 4 day

W.

ry 8 days. A

W.

Every 8 days

ton) Every 8 day

W.

els engaged in that trade met at the port of assem

eight days in September, 1917, was about 150, in convoys compris

sels (old battleshi

s and armed e

s and de

he "P" class (s

rawl

rt near Gibraltar, consisting of sloops, yachts, t

escort vessels to take the convoy on; about twelve more were needed for this work. The escorting vessels used for the outward convoys were destroyers or sloops which were due to proceed to sea to meet a homeward convoy, the routine being that the outward convoy should sail at such a time as would ensure the hom

llations, it was often not possible for the commodore to acquaint the Admiralty of this delay in time to stop the sailing of the outward convoys. Again, outward convoys were often delayed by bad weather, resulting in the homeward convoy not being met before entering the submarine zone. As the winter drew near this

wing was the position in resp

Frequency of Sai

y 4 days. At

n Every 4 da

ery 4 days. A

ery 8 days.

ry 4 days. A

eight days in convoys varying i

nd South America, between the Cape, South America and Dakar, and the coastal trade between North and South America. It was estimate

ean trade is d

ea speed of particular merchant ships. Some masters, no doubt from legitimate pride in their vessels, credited them with speeds in excess of those actually attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the fact that a ship had a dirty bottom reduced her speed to a very appreciable extent, and convoy commodores had occasionally to direct ships under such conditions to drop out of the convoy altogether and make their passage alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly owing to the risk involved. Decision as to the sea speed of convoys was taken by the

explained, had the effect of reducing signalling to a minimum, but it was necessary that each ship should have a signalman on board, and the provision of the number of signalmen required was no easy matter. A good wireless installation was essential in the escorting cruiser and in the Commodore's ship in order th

equence our wireless directional stations were able to fix their positions by cross bearings. This practice on the part

during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton), Falmouth, Lamlash, Rosslare (on the south-east coast of Ireland), Milford Haven, Sierra Leone and Dakar. This involved extensive work, and was undertaken and carried out with great rapidity by Captain F.C. Learmonth and his staff, whose work in the production of net defences during the war

under which so much of it was carried out. It will be realized by those who have been at sea in these small craft that little rest was obtainable in the Atlantic between the west coast of Ireland and the mouth of the Channel and positions 800 to 400 miles to the westward, except in the finest weather. When to this is added the constant strain imposed by watching for the

hat vessels of the destroyer and light cruiser type were actually under way per month, and these r

he flotillas stationed at Devonport were under way on

. of their time under way, as other vessels of the flotilla were laid up during the periods under rev

tention-and the conditions of life at sea in them will appreciate the significance of these fig

ilst standing the strain in a wonderful manner, were approaching the limit

ed that the convoy work produced far greater strain than any other duty carried out by destroyers. No mean proportion of the officers were suffering from a breakdown in health, and since the whole of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown

t in the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive of the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen, this being the compensation given in their work to the gallant personnel of the Dover, Harwic

ontrol of the Fleet. In the latter case the proper system is for the Admiralty to indicate to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands the objective, and to supply all the information possible regarding the strength of the enemy, his intentions and move

or the greater part of their passage were directed by the Naval Staff. Owing to ships not showing lights at night, convoys were diverted clear of one another by wireless signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity; they were directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in which submarines had been locat

e Vice-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken in charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff existed which kept a constant rec

rals, and it was naturally not possible to bring these vessels under discipline as was the case with convoys composed of purely British ships. Consequently there was much straggling, and the losses were proportionately heavier than in most of the Atlantic convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar co

losses which were experienced during the year amongst ships which were unescorted through

EWARD BOUND C

EPARTURE O

----------------------

No. lost |

rs | Ships

convoyed | con

|

----------------------

end |

AND | of |

ROADS | Au

----------------------

end |

1,000 |

ct. |

----------------

end |

1,280 | 1

ov. |

----------------------

end |

| of | 122

in July |

----------------

end |

359 | 8

ct. |

----------------

end |

484 | 1

ov. |

----------------------

end |

N. | of | 3,3

n April.| A

----------------

end |

4,800 |

ct. |

----------------

end |

5,560 | 3

ov. |

----------------------

end |

| of | 8,871

| Aug.

----------------

end |

12,446 |

ct. |

----------------

end |

14,416 |

ov. |

----------------------

onvoy 150 ships had been brought home without loss, whilst in t

D BOUND CONVOYS

OLLECTION

----------------------

No. lost |

rs | Ships

convoyed | con

|

----------------------

end |

of | 86 |

. | Aug

----------------

end |

360 | Nil

ct. |

----------------

end |

535 | 3

ov. |

----------------------

end |

| of | 35

ug. |

----------------

end |

175 | 2

ct. |

----------------

end |

| 284 |

ov. |

----------------------

end |

| of | 42 |

ug. |

----------------

end |

246 | Nil

ct. |

----------------

end |

414 | 1

ov. |

----------------------

end |

| of | 14 |

ug. |

----------------

end |

146 | Nil

ct. |

----------------

end |

185 | Nil

ov. |

----------------------

town 180 ships had been sent out up

lized the dangers run more than those responsible for finding protection; every available vessel was not only working at highest po

w the dangers which were

ngst Briti

in 1917 b

r separate e

nvoy or u

nder Sh

under u

t. co

ng June 30 .

g September 3

November .

with a convoy at the port of assembly. It was unfortunately quite impossible to provide escorts for all ships either to their ports of discharge or from their loading ports to the ports of assembly for the convoy, as we had so few vessels av

eft home waters in overseas trade exclusive of the Mediterranean trade. Of this aggregate 87.5 per cent, were in convoy, and the total number of these vessels sunk (13) was divided amongst the following trades: North America, 1; Gibralta

otal British losses of 51 ships for

north of

ween St. Abb's

mouth to the Do

annel 21 (

ol Ch

sh

f Bis

Cape St.

erran

Suez 1 (

onth of October, 1917, the number of vessels passing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and St. Abb's Head (to the northward) was 740 going north and 920 going south. Of th

became perilously low. Instead of a reserve of some five or six months we were gradually reduced to one of about eight weeks, and in order to economize expenditure of fuel it actually became necessary at one time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning warships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest urgency. Such an order in war was a matter of much gravity; the great majority of our light cruisers and destroyers were fit

orce, and in reply to representations made to the French Admiralty this system was altered by the French Commander-in-Chief. It should be noted that the Mediterranean outside the Adriatic was under French naval control in accordance with the agreement entered into with France and Italy. The cordial co-operation of the French Admiralty with us, and the manner in which our prop

ol of the traffic should be placed in the hands of officers stationed at Malta, this being a central position from which any necessary change in the arrangements could be made more r

posing that solution in 1917, and the alternative was adopted of British control of the traffic routes throughout the whole Mediterranean Sea subject to

rge of all the arrangements for the protection of trade and for anti-submarine operations, the patrol vessels of all the nationalities concerned being placed under his immediate orders for the purpose, whilst the whole of the Mediterranean remained under the general control of Vice-Admiral Gauc

s received great assistance from Admiral Funakoshi, the Naval Attach

eamanlike and gallant conduct of their officers and men was furnished on the occasion of the torpedoing of a British transport by an enem

the Mediterranean for this work. Divided control of the forces in that area was partly responsible for this. The Austrian destroyers were considered by the Italian Admiralty to be so serious a menace in the Adriatic as to render it necessary to keep in that sea the great majority of the Italian destroyers as well as several French vessels of this class. The situation at the eastern end of the Mediter

. It was estimated that the escort force required for the protection of a complete system of conv

son of its confined nature, is particularly suited for operations by submarines against trade. Its narrowness at various points, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Malta Channel, the Straits of Messina, and the passages to the ?gean cause such convergence of trade as to make it a very simple matter for a subm

shipping, combined with the increased length of the Cape route, influenced the Ministry of Shipping to press strongly for the Mediterranean as opposed to the other route. A "through" convoy from England to

amships per quarter in the Mediter

ending J

mber

and No

ing the whole system. I cannot hope that I have succeeded in conveying to readers of this volume an adequate conception of the great and marvellously successful performance that it was

and resource. Capt. H.G. Henderson, who had been associated with the convoy system from its start, was an invaluable assistant, as also was Commander I.W. Carrington. Capt. Richard Webb, the Director of the Trade Division, and Capt. Frederic A. Whitehead, the Director of the Mercantile Movements Division, took an important share in the wo