Straits of Dover and on the Belgian coast during the period of his command. There is little to be added to this great record, but it may be of interest to menti

ngland or on the left flank of the Allied Army in France. So long as the Belgian coast ports remained in German possession, the Naval force that could be based there constituted a very serious menace to the cross-Channel traffic. This really applied more to destroyers than to submarines, and for this reason: submarines have an infinitely larger radius of action than destroyers, and if the Belgian coast ports had not been in German occupation, the ad

achieved by the Navy alone unless backed up by an advance on land. The Admiralty was heart and soul for an audacious policy, providing the form of attack and the occasion offered a reasonable prospect of success. Owing to the preoccup

d being merely exits from Bruges, and the use of the latter could only be denied to the enemy by land attack or b

prevailed, and some temporary damage caused. Indeed, the fire against Ostend was so effective that the harbour fell into disuse as a base towards the end of 1917. We were arranging also in 1917 for mounting naval guns on shore that would bring Bruges un

favourable position the operation of making a passage by cutting away the upper works of the block-ships was not a difficult matter, and the Germans are a painstaking people. This passage could be used for some time on each side of high water by vessels like destroyers drawing less than 14 feet, or submarines drawing, say, 14 feet. The block would, therefore, be of a temporary and not a permanent nature, although it would undoubtedly be a source of considerable inconvenience.

empts had been made to prevent the passage of enemy submarines by means of obstructions, but without much success; and at the end of 1916 a "mine net barrage"-i.e. a series of wire nets of wide mesh carrying mines-was in process of being placed by us right across the Straits from the South Goodwin Buoy to the West Dyck Bank, a length of 28 miles, it being arranged that the French would continue the barrage from this position to the French c

moorings in the strong tide-way and fouling the nets. One series had to be entirely swept up for this reason. Many devices were tried with the object of improving this barrage, and many clever

d of 1917, however, evidence came into our possession showing that more submarines were actually passing the Straits of Dover than had been believed to be the case, and it became a question whether a proportion of the drifters, etc., required for

and Zeebrugge as well as the coast between those ports. These nets were laid at a distance of some 24,000 yards from the shore. This plan had proved most successful in preventi

hen the question of withdrawing the craft required for its maintenance for patrol work i

an in 1917. In both years a strong patrol of monitors, destroyers, minesweepers, drifters for net repairs, and other vessels was mai

he enemy, and between our own and enemy aircraft, were of very frequent occurrence. The Germans also introduced a new weapon in the form of fast motor boats controlled by a cable from the shore and guided by signals from aircraft, these boats being heavily loaded in the fore part with explosives whic

n of bombarding the bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. In the former case the targets fired at were the lock gates, and in th

account of the net barrage, and also because of the rapidity with which the "Knocke" and "Tirpitz" shore batter

d fire, thus interfering with our observation of fire even from aircraft, but in spite of this much damage resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of fire being ne

t ingenuity could devise and patient preparation could assist was done to ensure success. He received assistance from a staff which, though small in number, was im

al squadrons of our fighting machines were lent to the military for the operations carried out during the year on the Western Front; they did most excellent work, and earned the high commendation of Sir Douglas Haig (now Earl Haig). But we were still able to work against naval objectives. Zeebrugge, for instance, was bombed on seven nights during April and five nights during May, and during September a total weight of 86 tons of bombs was dropped on enemy objectives by the Dunkirk Naval aircraft, and we had good reason to be satisfied with the results achieved. During this same month 18 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 43 driven down. Attacks upon enemy aerodromes were very frequent, and this form of aerial offensi

The idea was for the aircraft to bomb Zeebrugge heavily in the vicinity of the Mole, as we ascertained by trial that on such occasions the enemy's destroyers left the Mole and proceeded outside the harbour. There we had our coastal motor boats lying off waiting for the destroyers to come out, and on the first occasion that the

tern mines were becoming available, some minelaying destroyers were sent to Dover; these vessels, as well as coastal motor boats and motor launches, were continually laying mines in the vicinity of Zeebrug

gian coast, the Dover force constantly laid traps for the enemy dest

es, as has been stated, were used on the cross-Channel barrage to watch for the passage of enemy submarines an

k of the destroyers engaged on the regular

espectively), and the fact that one and sometimes two German flotillas, each comprising eleven large and heavily armed torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually based on Bruges, together with a force of large modern torpedo boats and a very considerable number of submarines, it will be realized that the position was ever one of consi

for boiler cleaning, the vessels of the Dover Patrol working in very dangerous, foggy and narrow waters suffered heavy casualties from mines and collisions. The work of the Dover force included the duty of escorting the heavy traffic between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports, this being mostly carried on during daylight hours owing to the prevalence of submarine-laid mines and the necessity for sweeping the various channels before the traffic-which included a very large tr

raft of every description. It was always a marvel to me that the enemy showed such a lack of enterprise in failing to take advantage of these conditions. In order to protect these vessels to some extent, a light cruiser from Dover, and one usually borrowed from Harwich, toge

ss of night on a line some 30 miles in length, the number of vessels available rarely if ever exceeded six-viz. two flotilla leade

the circumstances of this attack after my arrival at the Admiralty led me to discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of keeping such forces as we had in the Straits at night concentrated

Reginald Bacon proposed that the portion of the examination service which dealt with south-going ships should be moved to Southend,

ch, though regrettable, were of no military importance, a good deal of ill-informed criticism was levelled at the Admiralty and the Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone conversant with the condit

elf; the actual damage done was almost negligible, apart from the loss of some eight lives, which we all deplored. It is perhaps natural that people who have never experienced war at close quarters shoul

of higher speed than anything we could bring against them, and more heavily armed than many of our destroyers. This force was based within seventy miles of Dover, and as the Germans had no traffic of any sort to defend, was always available for offensive operations against our up and down or cross-Channel

ctive); second, the merchant ships anchored in the Downs; third, the British monitors anchored off Dunkirk; fourth, the French ports, Dunkirk, Boulogne and Calais

emy destroyer can be seen at night is about a quarter of a mile, and the enemy could select any point of the 60 miles for attack, or could vary the scene of operations by bombarding Lowestoft or towns in the vicinity, which were only 80 miles from Zeebrugge and equally vulnerable to attack, since the enemy's destroyers could leave their base before dark, carry out their hurried bombardment, and return before daylight. In whatever quarter he attacked he could be certain of great local superiority

able, the Admiralty decided to take the matter in hand, and in the spring of 1917 some 6-inch naval guns taken from our reserves were mounted in the vicinity of the North Foreland. Further, an old monitor, which was of no use for other work owing to her machinery being unfit, was moored to the southward of Ramsgate, and her guns commanded the Downs. Searchlights were also mounted o

o the relief of destroyers of the "M" and "L" classes at Harwich by new vessels recently completed and by the weakening of that force numerically. The flotilla leaders were a great asset to Dover, as, although they were coal-burning ships and lacked the speed of the Germa

One detachment, consisting apparently of four boats, passed, it was thought, round the western end of the barrage at high tide close to the South Goodwin Buoy, and fi

E.R.G.R. Evans, C.B.), and the second sunk by torpedoes. Some of the remaining four boats undoubtedly suffered serious damage. Our flotilla leaders were handled with conspicuous s

erved, but once again an example was furnished of the manner in which public attention becomes riveted upon the dramati

e Straits of Dover by day and by night, in dense fogs, heavy gales and blinding snowstorms, in waters which were con

carried out by the drifters of the Patrol, manned largely by fisherme

be added that victory depends less on such enheartening incidents, welcome as they are, than on the patient and usually monotonous performance of duty at sea by day and by night in all

rines were passing the Straits of Dover in much greater numbers than we had hitherto believed

posal for a deep minefield on the line Folkestone-Cape Grisnez, but conf

made this portion of their passage submerged,

n that the earliest supplies of the new pattern mines were to be allocated for this service; the

of the Varne Shoal, so as to make it a complete barrier across the Channel. T

ovision of small light-ships fitted with searchlights and moored at intervals across the Channel, and also the use of flares from patrol craft. Flares had already been experimented with from kite balloons by the Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff,

mation we then possessed as to the passage of enemy submarines through the Straits of Dover. This committee visited Dover on sever

t recollect that any definite new ideas were evolved as the outcome of the labours of this committee; some ideas regarding the details of the minefield, particularly as to the best form of obstruction that would catch submarines or other vessels on the surface, were put forward, as also some p

er of patrol craft at the earliest possible moment. Interference by the Admiralty in such a detail of a flag officer's command would in my opinion have been dangerous and incorrect, for so long as a flag officer retains the confidence of the Board he must be left to work his command in the manner considered best by him after having been informed of the approved general policy, since he i

vy coast artillery. It was estimated that the whole force would be put on shore in a period of twenty minutes. The scheme is described in full in Chapter IX. of the first volume of Sir Reginald Bacon's book on the Dover Patrol. He had put the proposal before Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, my predecessor, who had expressed his concurrence so far as the naval portion of the scheme was concerned, and provided that the army made the necessary advance in Flanders. When the scheme was shown to me shortly after taking office as First Sea Lord I confess that I had some doubts as to the possibility of manoeuvring two monitors, with a pont

uite successful. It was necessary to see actual photographs of the tanks mounting the coping at the top of the sea wall to be convinced of the practicability of the scheme. A matter of great importance was the necessity for obtaining accurate information of the slope of t

a submarine which submerged in the vicinity of Nieuport and registered the height of water

cided that the 1st Division was to provide the landing party, conferences took place between Admiral Bacon and General Sir Henry Rawlinson (now Lord Rawlinson), and I took the o

rise, more particularly in the selection of the landing place. Admiral Bacon describes in his book the methods by which secrecy was preserved. As time passed, and the atrocious weather in Flanders during the summer of 1917 prevented the advance of our Army, it became more and more difficult to

allipoli that neither Sir Reginald Bacon nor I shared these doubts. The heavy bombardment of the coast batteries by our own shore guns, which had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact of the landing being a complete surpris

the Belgian coast, and they could only be taken by means of a combined operation. Sir John French (now Field-Marshal Viscount French) himself had

it became necessary to abandon it owing to the inability of the Army to co-operate the intense

e local craft at the Nore. The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the command of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels

o join forces with the Grand Fleet should event

econnaissance work in the southern part o

e covering force for aerial operations carried

raft that might be located in southern waters and to attac

passage of the convoy of merchant ships between

einforcements for the Dover Patrol or to assist

great deal of work for the Harwich for

ald Tyrwhitt's operations; he took the matter philosophically, although I always realized how difficult it made his work at times, and

. During the year new vessels were either added to it or replaced older craft which were withdrawn for other s

ht to seaward of our minefields. The objects of the presence of our ships in

ight be intending to operate off our coasts or

d attack enemy min

ns either on reconnais

ng between Dutch and German ports, or neu

when engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting also on the two occasions on which attacks were made on the Scandinavian convoy; but a portion of the Harwich force succeeded on one occasion in intercept

Dutch ports and Germany during the year, but the main result of the operations of this force was shown in the refu

destroyer attack, and one by mine. The price paid by the force for this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and one by collision, and the damage of three destroyers by mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light cruiser by collisi

to German agents once the time of sailing was given out, and that the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and submarines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the Ems or other German ports. The orders of course emanated from the Admiralty, and of all

r. Our association commenced during my command of the Grand Fleet, but became of course much closer at the Admira

that he held such important Staff appointment