that the United States Navy was at the time indifferently provided with the particular classes of vessels which were so greatly needed for submarine warfare, viz. destroyers and other small surface

large and about twenty-four small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the Atlantic; there were about twelve submarines capable of working overseas, but not well suited for anti-submarine work, and only three light cruis

d cause. The Germans did not, however, make sufficient allowance for the productive power of the United States, and perhaps also it was thought in Germany that public opinion in the United States would not allow the Navy Department to send over to European waters such destroyers and other vessels of value in anti-submarine warfare as were available at once or would be

deas of Sir Percy Scott of our own Navy, who had revolutionized British naval gunnery, and he had succeeded, in his position as Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy, in producing a very marked increase in gunnery efficiency. Later when in command, first of a battleship, then of the destroyer flotillas, and finally as head of the United States

l craft of sufficient speed to deal with submarines, other vessels of these classes following as fast as they could be produced; further that submarines and light cruisers would also be of great value as they became available. Admiral Sims responded wholeheartedly to my requests. He urged the Navy Department with all his force to send these vessels and send them quickly. He frequently telegraphed to the United States

l Sir Montague Browning, had been directed to confer with the United States Navy Dep

raiders escape from the North Sea, that six United States destroyers would be sent to European waters in the immediate future, and that the United States would undertake the protection of trade on the west coast of Canada and North America a

mission, was requested to do all in his power to impress on the United States Navy Department the very urgent necessity that exi

e number of trawlers and sloops available for patrol and escort duty was greatl

otection of shipping in the vicinity of the United States coast, but it was at the same time indicated that our experience showed that the number of sub

ce in the production of mines, and the provision of ships for minelaying work. Great stress was, of course, laid upon the very important question of a large output of merchant ships and the necessity for repairing and putting into service the German merchant ships interned in U.

ower, as illustrated by the work accomplished by him in providing us in 1915 with ten submarines built in the extraordinarily short period of five months, that he would produce sloops at a very rapid rate and that there would be no delay in starting if he undertook the work. The drawings had already been sent over. However he was

e subjects, the heavy losses taking place in merchant ships were stated, and every

from these quotations from a personal telegram

al de Chair fro

very serious nature of the shipping position. We lost 55 British ships

yers sent to Ireland should be increased to tw

centration on the vital question of d

the submarine menace and that by far the most important pl

horities the great gravity of the situation a

ffective until July and the cr

. It was therefore necessary to be quite frank with Admiral Sims; we knew quite well that we could not expect new measures to be effective for some few months, and we knew also that we could not afford a continuance of the heavy rate of loss experienced in April, without a serious effect being produced upon our war effort. We were certainly not in the state of panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters, but we did want those who were engaged in the war on the side of the Allies to understand the situation in order that they might realize the value that early naval assistance would bring to the Allied cause. There is no doubt that great difficulty must be experienced by those far removed from the theatre of war in understanding the conditions in the war zone. This was exemplified at a time when we had organized the trade in convoys and the system was showing itself effective in greatly reducing losses from submarine attack. We were pressing the

and they were most welcome. It was interesting to me personally that Lieut.-Commander Taussig should be in command, as he, when a sub-lieu

n the war theatre caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to myself. As a result of the advice tendered a great building programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting motor launche

d not appear there until May, 1918. The moral effect of such action in 1917 would have been very great and might possibly have led to the retention in the United States of some of the destroyers and other small craft which were of such assistance in European waters in starting the convoy system. Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxious on this head

n the occasion of Sir Lewis Bayly, at my urgent suggestion, consenting to take a few days' leave in the summer of 1917, Admiral Sims, at our request, took his place at Queenstown, hoisting his flag in command of the British and United States naval forces. The relations between the officers and men of the two navies in this Command were of the happiest possible nature, and form one of the pleasantest episodes of the co-operation between the two nations. The United States officers and men very quickly realized the strong personality of the Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown, and became imbued with the same feelings of great respect and admirat

sers and a number of revenue cutters as patrol and escort vessels, placing the whole force under the British senior naval officer at Gibraltar, Rear-Admiral Heathcote Grant. Here again the relations betwee

Admiral Benson, the Chief of Operations in the United States Navy Department, when he came over later in the year. Admiral Benson gave directions that four coal-burning battleships should be sent over. We were obliged to ask for coal-burning battleships instead of the more modern vessels with oil-fired boilers owing to the great shortage of oil fuel in this cou

ussions, first between Admiral Sims and mys

f the United States Navy Department sending officers of experience of different ranks to work in the Admiralty, both on the operations and material side, officers upon whom the Navy Department could rely to place before us the views of the Department and to transmit their view of the situation as the result of the

of the two countries and, further, that the United States Navy Department would

waters had been placed under the command of British naval officers. This step, so conducive to good results owing to the unity of command which wa

ial, as was the experience which the admirals gained of modern naval warfare. Moreover, the utterly baseless suggestion which had, unfortunately, found ex

med me that the main objects of his visit as

n our present p

f any, that were contemplated in th

uld provide from resources then available or likely to be soon available, and the

ng full information of our immediate needs, of past procedure

convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy. An

ers for the same reason. The total addition o

er of patrol craft, tugs, e

building of

d barrage in the North Sea, and assistance towards laying

e large seaplane stations on the coast of Ir

"Dreadnought" type to replace Grand Fleet "Dreadnought"

to the large number that it was proposed that we ourselves should lay in the barrage, and that as the barrage would need patrolling by a large number of small craft, great help would be afforded if the United S

prospect of obtaining mines in adequate numbers for such work for at least nine to twelve months, nor could we provide the necessary craft to patrol the barrage. Our view was that such mines as became available during the last months of 1917 would be more effecti

vantag

wegian territorial waters for egress, a North Sea Barrage would be a menace to

sweep up the minefield, owing to its d

advanta

me 120,000, excluding reserves-and the impr

in which no mines had ever been successfully laid before; time would be requir

rines to dive into that portion of the minefield which was safe for surface v

itorial waters, in which, even if mines were laid, they would have to be mo

be satisfactory for the purpose of the barrage. An experienced mining officer was at once sent over by us to inspect the mine an

Our own efforts to produce a mine suitable for very great depths were also proving successful and anticipations as to manufacture were optimistic. Accordingly plans were prepared for a barrage across the North Sea, which were given to Admiral Mayo before he left England on his return to the United States. Without s

countries, to the Belgian coast problem, to the blockade, to the defence of trade (including one on the convoy system), to such subjects as the defensive armament of merchant ships with guns, smoke apparatus and mine defence gear, the

ciate the whole position and its many embarrassments, though we realized that these could be appreciated only by those who, like Admiral Sims, wer

ting constant economic pressure upon the enemy with a view to forcing him to come to terms. We also endeavoured to prevent the enemy from

cations of the Allied armies and the

rder to interfere with his military op

ce to invasi

action and as its destruction had hitherto not been achieved, we had adopted a policy of guarding an area between our vital communications and the enemy's ports, and of guarding the areas through which the trade and transports passed; these were the only methods of frustrating attacks made either by surface vesse

of controlling the Dover and Norway-Scotland exits to the North Sea had been adopted. The former protected the communications of the armies in France, whilst the two com

enemy from our mines and torpedoes, had so far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships; we had to depend on the

ce of the Grand Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa. This fleet ensured the safety of all th

nd having been fought in the previous year, any future movement of the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would probably be merely with the object of drawing our capital ships into prepared areas so as to bring a

had inflicted losses on trade, losses from such causes could not reach really serious proportions so long as the enemy trusted to evasion and refused to face the Grand Fleet. The danger of serious loss from attack by raiding surface craft had also been greatly minimized by the adoption of the

he submarine campaign had been to remove the barrier established by the Gr

s had therefore been put into force. Merchant ships had been armed as rapidly as possible, and in addition efforts had

ade the provision of a sufficient number of patrol vessels a practical impossibility and had led to a

pen waters, by extensive mining in the Heligoland Bight, with the ex

mpaign was the dominating factor to such an extent that any sustained increas

m; the policy of coping with submarines after they reached the open sea had not as yet been sufficiently effective to

the areas between the enemy's ports and our trade routes, and it was proposed to form some description of block or barra

ly or by mines all the exits of the submar

ent depths, from near the surfac

of surface craft and aircraft whose object would be to f

of sufficient extent to prevent submarines coming to the surf

impracticability of carrying it out. Such a plan had been advocated by some officers and by other people; it was, of course, most attractive in theory and appealed strongly to those who looked at the question superficially. When, however, a definite operation came to be worked out in detail the difficulties became very apparent, and even enthusiastic supporters of the idea were forced to change their views. It wa

nded to seal the enemy's ports somehow, and that they were to devise the best possible scheme, drawing up all the necessary orders for the operations. This was done in the

d not have been a complete cure, since submarines could still make their exit via the Katt

ves provided that a satisfactory type of mine could be produced in sufficient number

a line totalling 230 miles in length, which was divided into three parts, A

es, and it was proposed that this area should be mine

ments being 67,500 mines, and that the United States should mine

given, and the advantages arising from the use of the United States pa

as mines were available, with a strong force of patrol vessels stationed there, whose duty it would be to compel enemy submarines to

g as their object the prevention or obstruction of the exit of enemy submarines from the Adriatic, in the same way as it was hoped to obstruct German submarines from making their exit from the North Sea without incurring heavy losses. The great depth of water in the southern part

Policy showed the aim

t with the Grand Fleet, and, in this respect, to perform the duty of light cru

he escort of merchant ships in convoy. For these airships stations

e resources of the latter station were supplemented by a kite balloon ship. It was intended also to provide kite balloons for flotillas or single vessels engaged in

three new stations for the use of non-rigids for anti-submarine work were to be established, while it was also proposed to provide sufficient resourc

e Grand Fleet was at the time already provided with three seaplane carriers, and the Furious and other special vessels were being fitted to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured vessels and light cruisers of the

ensive work were under construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the coast under constant observation, of spotting t

tish Isles and in the Mediterranean was touched upon,

ton

nd

h Sh

bri

ls

tla

ingh

mou

ixs

tga

ve

hav

rbo

mou

wl

il

hgu

of stations as soon as possible, the new p

ds

xf

ens

eha

h F

(or in the

tla

erh

s recommended that the three main seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken over by

organization was given, with the results up to date, and detail

chant ships and fitting other defensive measures to them, and the

ointed out that anti-submarine measures were carried

sures were desc

few fast vessels, such as destroyers or "P" boats, had been formed into hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas had suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers

six sloops or destroyers was being organized as vessels became available, to operate

were not actually in the hunting flotillas were all engaged in anti-submar

rman submarines would, in order to attack vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the fast craft engaged i

n waters, inspected some of our naval ba

d Bacon and myself in H.M.S. Broke to witness a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor Terror. On this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag was hoisted in the Broke and subsequently presented to him as a souvenir of the first occas

gret that we witnessed their return to the United States. My own associations with the Admiral had led to a feeling of great friend

an Allied Naval Council consisting of the Ministers of Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff of the Allied Nations and of the United States. This proposal had been under discussion for some little time, and, indeed, naval conferences had been held on previous occasions. The first of these during my tenure of office at the Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another was held

the early part of December. Its functions were to watch over the general conduct of the naval war and to insure co-ordin

n-Chief at sea towards their Governments as regards operations in hand as well as the strategical and technical disposition of the forces plac

ed States were working, and where the need for close co-operation was most urgent. The real need in the Mediterranean, as was frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval forces of

ing armies, were so seriously taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty were being constantly and gravely delayed. The Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarrassed by difficulties in the adequate supply of mines and other means of destroying submarines as well as of fast craft of