old wars and had proved its value in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was natural that thoughts should be directed towards its reintroduction when the submari

number of ships at one time may cause congestion and consequent delay at the port of unloading. However, if additional safety is given there is compensation for this delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy system under modern conditions should be mentioned, viz. the increased risk from attack by mines. If ships are sailing singly a minefield

t it was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers available for escort work was entirely insufficient, and that, consequently, the suggestions could not be adopted. This objection was one that could only be over

It was known that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to commence, and that this would mean that shipping would usually be subjected to torpedo attack from submarines when in a submerged condition. Against this form of attack the gun armament of cruisers or armed merchant ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully armed, ships of this type w

ainst torpedo attack by submarines was quite a different matter from such a system as a preventive against attack by surface vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the days of sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not very necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed in loo

the usual formation of four, five or six columns. Since the number of destroyers or sloops that could be provided for screening the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines was bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was essential that the columns of ships should be as short as possible; in other words, that the ships should follow one another at close intervals, so that the destroyers on each side of the convoy should be able as far as possible to guard it from attack by submarines working from the flank, and that they s

25 Merchant Ships, With an Escort of 6 Destroyers Zigzagging at High Speed

to Its Caption, 'Typical Convoy and Escort

e to ordinary cargo vessels, many of which were of very slow speed, and possessed a large proportion of officers and men of limited sea experience, owing to the very considerable personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined the Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in patrol craft. Moreover, even the troop

having been taken for the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) the inexperience of their engineers, combined with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments of speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room telegraphs and the poor quality of much of the coal used. When pressed as to the greatest number of ships that could be expected to manoeuvre together in safety, the masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen, gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three was the maximum number. The opinions thus expressed we

hant ships of all nationalities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well as those of Allied and neutral countries, bega

submarine attack alone gave the following monthly average: Bri

s of 1917 the figures b

lies. Neutr

000 62,000 1

000 77,000 13

0 74,000 149

0 133,000 18

s entered the war

e is the loss of fis

se for considerable anxiety, the later figures made it clear that some method of counteracting t

necessary for the production of vessels and more or less complicated matériel, and in these circumstances the only step that could be taken was that of giving a trial to the convoy system for the ocean trade, although the time was b

is true that these convoys were always very much scattered, particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented exceptional difficulties in the matter of organization and handling. The number of destroyers which could be spared for screening the convoys was also very small. The protection afforded was therefore more apparent

ezvous outside the zone of submarine activity, where it would be met by the flotilla of small vessels which would protect the convoy through the submarine area. It was essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station-keeping by day, and at night, with th

hant ships would be required for this service if the homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was considered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary to

ng officers and men periodically, only a proportion of these were available at any one time. A number of these vessels were required to escort troop transports through the submarine danger zone. During the month of February six sloops were diverted from their proper work of minesweeping in the

ort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom, our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable for escorting

t shown by the following table, which reveals the destr

----------------------

terr

---------------------

bro

---------------------

stown

--------------------

ana.

--------------------

hannel.

--------------------

Invergordo

-------------------

e. | |

-------------------

er. | |

-------------------

t. | | |

------------------

| | | |

------------------

. | | | |

---------------+ |

| | | | |

-------------+ |

| | | | |

----------+ | | |

. | | | | | |

-------+ | | | |

| | | | | | |

--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-

| | | | | |

| | | |

| 10| 2| 3| | |

| | | |

| 97|45|18|14|13|

| | | | |

| | | |

ver | | | | | |

er | | | | | |

|11| 6|16| 9| | 9

| | | |

5| | 4|10| 4|

--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-

| | | | |

| | | |

| 10| 3| 4| | |

| | | |

95|23|29|38|15| |

| | | | |

| | | |

ver | | | | | |

er | | | | | |

|10| 5|16| 7| |29

| | | |

6| | 8| 9| 4|

--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-

| | | | | |

| | | |

| 11| 4| 6| | |

| | | |

101|24|26|37| 9| |

| | | | |

| | | |

ver | | | | | |

er | | | | | |

|10| 4| 8|12| 2|3

| | | |

6| |31| | | 1

--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-

oyers detached for protecti

ludes United Sta

nd utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but it was felt that as this would leave the whole of the remaining trade entirely without protection,

trade protection. The only commands on which it was possible to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the destroyer

fewer opportunities for offensive action against submarines. There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on which we could draw yet further. It had always been held that the Grand Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine attack when at sea and of countering the enemy's destroyers and attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure by the early spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of requirements in earlier months. It was well known to us that the High Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its selected moment, and it was quite probable that the number might be much higher, as many more vessels were available. At our average moment, even with a nominal force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, we could not expect that more than seventy destroyers and e

tack. The claimants for this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great majority of them are people without any knowledge of the sea and naval matters, certainly none

ssary protecting vessels could be provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued since, that we should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will not,

e material imported into countries contiguous to Germany came from the United States. There was reason to anticipate that steps would be taken by the United States authorities in the direction of some form of rationing of these countries, and in t

by his wonderful success in the post of Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. That success was due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but also to his attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of humour, and quick and accurate grasp of any problem with which he was confronted. It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been selected to command the United States forces in European waters, for to the qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind with absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This characteristic has led him on more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the circumstances with which we had to deal in 191

y to be collected at Gibraltar. The necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with orders to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that lay before them, and to explain to them the system of sailing, the manner in which the convoy would be handled, and the protection that would be afforded. This naturally took time, and the convoy did not arrive in England until after the middle of

convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the homeward-bound trade was convoyed. Then the system was gradually extended to include first 60 per cent., then 80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the ho

t that all the available destroyers and most of the sloops were used as escorts, wi