gh Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Bra

-Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body-the wife, e.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama-vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea, mountains, &c.-all of which are included in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove something-, and we therefore miss a uniform kind of existence common to all those things.-Let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on the latter!-This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof.-Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle-called 'ap?rva,' or by similar names-which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental caus

uited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non- intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.)-Nor may we assume, as a 'less complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world- constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of such power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe.-The contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence, omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the inf

knowledge is just the presence of effects.-But volitions, even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!-This objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that-as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are-inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is capable of constructing the e

that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is the fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what has to be proved-for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).-Moreover, if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established (for experience does not show that all things are produced together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is born' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on, are connected with pleasu

be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other body; for this leads us into a regressus in infinitum.-Should we, moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not?-The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and w

topic of Scripture only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., does give authoritative information as to a Brahman

e Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or ces

ds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of