ement of wage disputes.-Section 2. Some preliminary notes on the subsequent exposition. The question of the political machinery required to put any policy of wage settlement int

.-Section 7. Its effect upon industrial organization, prices, and managerial ability.-Section 8. Its effect upon the output of the wage earners. This question cannot be

e. The way has thus been prepared for an attempt to work out principles for use in the settlement of industrial disputes. Past experience in industrial arbitration or adjudication is a fertile source of suggestion in this endeavor; although much of it has been rather like a search i

satisfaction. If adopted, they would serve as a substitute for a resort to open force in such disputes. Their acceptance would mean that when ordinary collectiv

bsequent exposition requires

wage settlement. Indeed, at the end of the book, an attempt is made to combine them into such a policy. Not that it is believed that any policy of wage settlement can really be wrought in a piece this way. But because it is believed that ultimately it will be recognized that wage disputes cannot be settled as

ided. To have attempted to discuss that question systematically would have greatly complicated this inquiry. In places, indeed, it will be found impossible to gauge the operation of some p

ave been applied in the pursuance of the aim of industrial peace. No effort will be made to classify the various theories or principles which have been put forward somewhere or sometime in the past, and then to submit each theory or principle to cr

dard rate for each occupation, minor differences in the nature of the work due to varying physical and other conditions being disregarded."[69] It represents the desire to do away with the great variety of wage rates for the same work which frequently exists, and the substitution therefor of a minimum wage rate. Good examples of i

e upon the wage bargain of the economic position of the individual wage earner, or of the inefficiency or policy of the individual employer, is greatly curtailed. The common rule is a suit

on prices in some instances ten to twenty dollars cheaper per thousand lower than the cigar makers and unions of different localities, and, Whereas cigar manufacturers are taking advantage of the situation, moving their factories or establishing branches of them in cheaper districts ... and, Whereas this is detrimental to the welfare of the cigar makers and detrimental to the principles of the Cigar Makers International Union be it resolved by this convention that the Cigar Makers International Union adopt as one of its aims the

many open questions as to the limits of its applicability. It has in the main the approval of public opinion, as shown by its acceptance in a

tail, in order to be able to measure the effect of the introduction of the princi

ners employed upon the tasks to which they apply. They do sometimes become the actual rates received by most of the wage earners concerned; they become the wage, ordinarily, of those workers who fall around the average in skill and experience. This fa

f a legally fixed rate, this rate is frequently the maximum. Yet such instances are in the minority. Employers do not reduce the pay of their most competent workers because they are compelled to pay those less qualified at a minimum rate."[72] It will be found usually that the abler, the more skilled or more experienced workers in particular occupations receive higher wages than the standard, because of the special value of their services.[7

acrifice within the group, than the idea of equal payment for equal product. This is illustrated in the report signed by the Labor Members of the Committee on Industrial Relations (1912-16) in reference to the wage payment systems of scientific management which reads, "... All of these systems of (i.e., of scientific management) payment tend to center the attention of the worker on his individual interest and gain and to repress the development of group consciousness and interest. Where the work of one man is independent of another, the individual has no motive to consider his fellow, since his work and pay in no wise

orkers to keep their output around a certain general level; which level, indeed, is determined only by all the circumstances governing the group attitude in the particular shop or industry. The "Report on Collective Agreements in the United Kingdom" (1910) has stated this as follows: "Although the main distinction between time wages and piece wages is of the nature described above, it is of importance to note that, whether the method of remuneration adopted be expressed as payment by results or as payment by time, the amount of work performed and the time taken in perfo

collective agreement. In that way the group interest in a defined minimum standard wage is protected, and the principle of standardization realized. As Prof. Pigou has written, "In order that the piece-wage system, and the benefit to

the standard wage, what results can be predicted

effect upon individual independence and initiative. This question cannot be satisfactorily discussed apart from the larger one of which it is a part-that is the question of th

rwise would be. On the other hand, it indirectly guards for the individual an independence and vigor of spirit often lost in modern industry. When the underlying philosophy of the "common rule" is deeply ingrained the problems of industrial direction are completely changed; they become more difficult. Production becomes a task involving the power to win men to their work. Where the

le effect on the total amount of employment. It has often been contended that the multiplicity of wage rates for approximately the same work in industries in which wages are not settled by collective bargaining, is to be accounted for, above all, by the varying efficie

y account for a great many of the irregularities. Prof. Marshall has expressed one view of the matter well. He writes, "Cliffe Leslie and some other writers have na?vely laid stress on local variations of wages as tending to prove that there is little mobility among the working classes, and that competition among them for employment is ineffective. But most of the facts they quote ... are only half facts and when the missing halves are supplied, they generally

A. McCabe writes, "Very little seems to be known as to differences of efficiency among men engaged in the same kind of work." But as he adds, "It is safe t

pply situation of that group at the time when standardization is introduced. If the need for the services of a group is relatively great, employment at the standard rate will be given even to those members of the group who are decidedly below the average efficiency of the group. Such is the case during periods of industrial expansion. When the demand for the services of the group falls, however, it is probable that these men will be discharged first-more promptly than if wage standardization had not

in the situation. We have seen that in the board trades of Victoria there has frequently been a decrease in the number of employees immediately after a determination became effective, but that in almost every instance this decline was temporary. After the period of adjustment, industry pursued its normal course. This seems to have been the general experience in this and other states."[81] It may be concluded that some redistribution of available employment will sometimes follow upon the introduction of the standard wage into industries in which wages were hitherto

tice to the enforcement of those rates that are already being paid by the better organized units of that industry.[82] This leveling process may have any or all of several consequences. It may cause enterprises which had succeeded in competing partly because they paid lower wages than more efficient enterprises f

tandardization, inconsiderable.[83] They are witness to the fact that improvements in the level of industrial management and a gradual elimination of the less competent employers have frequently taken place. The opinion seems warranted that unless standardization is introduced under very unfavorable circumstances or in the form of

idered, however. It is an aspect of the subject which has been in the forefront of discussion. It also is a topic

rk receive that wage irrespective of small differences in ability, there will remain no stimulus for the abler workmen to exert themselves. Or in other words, that the standard wage makes slackers of all men. Sometimes this criticism is leveled only against the standard time wage; a

n does not mean that all wage earners receive the same wage irrespective of differences in ability. It simply sets a minimum standard for all workers of the group who are about the average in ability.

al system. There exists a conflict between two views of the nature of industrial society, and of the way of industrial progress. In one the social importance of a high level of production predominates, and the wage earner is argued about merely as part of a productive organization. In the other, the wage earner is viewed primarily as a member of an occupational group or class, whose wages should be regulated by the standard of life of his group or class, rather than by strict measurement of his own individual capacity. This conflict is revealed, as R. F. Hoxie pointed out, in the antagonism between unionism and scientific m

ndardization, while at the same time giving special reward to individuals, deserve encouragement, provided they safeguard the group interest in a defined minimum standard wage. Still it is not likely that the solution for the problems

es. The views and motives of the wage earners and of the employers are likely to remain constant under different systems of wage payment-and thus the outcome is not likely to differ greatly. No matter what the method

rtily in the ideals and aims of unionism, and act accordingly, the system of wage payment adopted will be a factor of secondary importance in determining the effectiveness with which the wage earners perform their work. The motives and sentiments of the various organized groups will govern the action of the wage earners, and produce almost the same result under any system of wage payment. The st

ed and thoroughly understood negotiation between the directors of industry and the workmen. Barring the development

ion, but also caused a considerable loss of working time, and fostered a continuous pre-occupation with the question of wages and related questions. In view of these facts, the various governmental agencies of wage settlement undertook to introduce into all wage contracts the principle of standardization throughout large areas. Witness, for example, the conclusion of the Shipbuilding Adjustment Board on the matter. "One of the most serious influences retarding the progress of the shipbuilding industry according to the

ld serve to limit the shifting of the labor supply to movement between different industries and occupations, and to cases which represent movem

TNO

ned principle has been made by Mr. Wilson Comption in an article entitled "Wage Theories in Industrial Arbitration." In its enumeration and discussion of the difficultie

bitral Determination of

dustrial Democracy,

to 1920 Convention, Cigar Maker

Report of the Factory Investigating Commission, New York State (1915). See also R.

nt wage. The proportion of men receiving more than the union minimum is frequently large because the competitive wage has increased since the minimum was established" (page 116); and secondly, that "the extent to which differential wages are paid above the union minimum, when that rate is the rate actually paid to the men whose efficiency is about the average, varies widely in different trades.... Standardization of

tside the union in the same trade, because the mere insistence on a standard rate tends to exclude some men much below the standard of competency. Secondly, practically all of the skilled trades unions require candidates for membersh

Standard Rate in America

, O'Connell, and Garrettson. Vol. I, "Final Report of th

reements in the United Kingd

"Economics of We

inciples of Economics

in), pages 110-111. See for similar view, 4th Report of N. Y. State Facto

Standard Rate in America

Australasia," Fourth Report of the Factory Invest

ges 172-5,

bia, Massachusetts and Oregon. Also the studies by R. H. Tawney and M. E. Bulkely on the En

view, May, 1918, page 136. See in same issue of the review, "Decision for Shipyards of San Francisco Bay and Columbia River, and Puget Sound D