h Great Britain made that the Transvaal was recruiting forces in Europe were not proved against the States from which the recruits came. The numbers in the parties which

recognize the Boers as belligerents in the international sense, but it warned German subjects that a condition of affairs existed which called for vigilance on their part in their conduct toward, the contestants. Later, when the British Government announced that the war would be recognized retroactively as entitled to full belligerent status, Germany declared the governmental attitude to be that of strict neutrality in the contest. An attempt of the Boers to recruit in Damaraland was promptly stopped by the German officers in control, who were ordered to allow neither men nor horses to cross the border for the purposes of the war. All German steamship lines which held subventions from the Government were warned that if t

es, Weekly Ed., Oct. 5,

rnment. The German Government, too, had advised the Republics to invite mediation, but at that time President Kruger declared that the moment had not yet come for applying for the mediation of America. The United States, it was conside

s each believed that President Kruger should not have rejected the English proposal then before him for a joint commission of inquiry.[2] The German Government had nothing for which to reproach itself in regard to the outbreak of war or with reference to the fate of the Republics. "Of course there are certain lengths to which we could not possibly go. We could not, in order to prevent the door from being slammed, let our own fingers be crushed between the door and the hinges; that would not have helped the Boers and

and later submitted the proposals of August 19, which he alleged had been" induced "by their implied acceptance on the part of the British agent. When these proposals lapsed from the fact of their non-acceptance by the British Government, he declared that he was ready to return to the discussion of the proposed jo

ichstag, London Times, De

, involving the idea of coercion, was never considered by the German Government because of the general situation of the world and of special German interests. The idea of anything other than entirely peaceful and friendly intervention was not entertained by any power in considering the situation in South Africa. The German Chancellor declared that "even those Powe

imperilling direct German interests in order to prevent the outbreak of war. In particular we acted in the most straightforward manner toward the governments of the South African Republics inasmuch as from the first and in good time we left them in no doubt regarding the situation in Europe and also regarding our own neutrality in t

ech in Reichstag

tee of ladies in Paris made a direct appeal to the French people. They declared: "We are not biased enemies of the British Nation ... but we have a horror of grasping financiers, the men of prey who have concocted in cold blood this rascally war. They have committed with premeditation a crime of lèse-humanité, the greatest of crimes. May the blood which reddens the battle-fields of South Africa forever be upon their heads.... Yes, we are heart and soul with the Boers.... We admire them because old men and young women, even, are all fighting like heroes.... Alas! to be sure, there is no more a France, nor yet an America.... Ah! Ideal abode of the huma

n Times, April 2,

s who repeatedly refused arbitration, that is, it was explained, upon the British Government; that the British Government, in ignoring the principles of right and justice, in refusing arbitration and in using menaces only too likely to bring about war in a dispute which might have been settled by judicial methods, had committed an outrage against the rights of nations calculated to re

n Times, Oct. 3, 1

lgium expressing the hope that the mistake of depriving the Republics of their independence would not be committed, and favoring an energetic appeal to the powers for intervention. The

d Berlin in August neither the Emperor nor the Chancellor was in the city and consequently the visit had no official significance, but in St. Petersburg a more favorable reception awaited them. The Official Messenger announced on August 26 that Dr. Leyds had been received in audience by the Czar. This statement, coming as it did from the official organ of the Foreign Office, seemed to

ondon Times, J

e Governments of the Transvaal and Great Britain but which it was alleged had not been published in the Blue Books. This assertion of sinister motives on the part of Great Britain exerted little influence upon foreign government

h Government in other respects caused severe criticism in England. The chief circumstance which confirmed the opinion that Holland as a neutral State had not displayed a proper attitude at Lorenzo Marques was the fact that after the visit of the envoys of the Transvaal the Hague Government had sent a man-of-war to the island of St. Helena, which was being used as a prison for the Boers who were transported from South Africa. This proceeding was viewed by England as officious from the fact that foreign men-of-war were not usually received

he beginning of the war. These Powers in their official statements all followed such a course, realizing that it was demanded by a sound foreign policy. They

eing neutral, it was the duty of the Portuguese Government to observe the laws of neutrality. Great Britain alleged that a constant stream of supplies and recruits passed over the Portuguese border to aid the Boer armies. The difficulty on the part of the English Government, however, was to prove that the goods were in fact on their way to a belligerent destination or that small parties o

the Transvaal should not be landed until further notice from the Portuguese Government. The Transvaal strongly protested against this act as a breach of a treaty between the two Governments in which by Article VI the Portuguese Government was prohibited from stopping ammunition intended for the Transvaal, but upon representations by England might stop ammunition on its way to any English colony. The opinion in the Transvaal was that the act on the part of Portugal and Great Britain constituted an act of war, in that peaceable negotiations were still pending, a view which seems fully warranted since Portugal p

he headquarters of Transvaal agents of every description who were in daily communication with their Government and with Europe. The English authorities felt themselves helpless to prevent the importation of machinery and other material required for the mines which were worked by the Transvaal Government. Even explosives for the government factory and actual ammunition reache

zo Marques had taken over in the way of friendly offices the interests of the Orange Free State as well as those of the Transvaal. It was also ascertained that the consul of Holland was the manager of the local agencies for a number of steamboat companies, among t

s unpatriotic action on the part of British subjects controlling the banks made easy the work of the Boer forwarding agents; it was alleged, and the fact seemed pretty well authenticated, that the Dutch consul, Mr. Pott, facilitated this work by allowing contraband to be landed at night. Such articles thrown into half-laden trucks upon the railway

es, Weekly Ed., Jan. 12

ants were required to give guarantees through their respective consuls that they were not going to the Transvaal for the purpose of enlisting. The Portuguese authorities took the matter in hand, and persons attempting to

es, Weekly Ed., Jan. 19

s the head of a Boer organization for facilitating the entrance of men desiring to enlist with the Boer forces. He was consequently cautioned in January by the Portuguese Governor that if he recruited for the Boer forces or was detected doing anything inconsistent with the neutral obligations of Portugal, a request would be made to the Netherlands Government to have him transferred to another field. The Portuguese authorities at the same time began a closer supervision of

rom all parts of Europe, and were allowed to proceed to the Transvaal for the purpose of either actually enlisting with the Boers or working the government mines. It was alleged, too, that a number of these newcomers were "smart looking men," evidently officers. The majority, however, were of a low class, mostly penniless adventurers. On February 2 the report was made to the English authorities that twenty of the

mes, Weekly Ed., Feb. 5

thorities had been reduced by the increased watchfulness at Lorenzo Marques, for the distance from the port of Inhambane to the Transvaal could be covered only by native carriers and required fourteen days for the trip. The difficulties in evading the customs surveillance at Lorenzo Marques had also been increased by the fact that most of the steamship companies which had at first employed the Dutch consul as their agent had later relie

weak administration not too scrupulous in seeing that an impartial view was taken of the situation. The failure of the Boers to attain their ends in the field did more to improve the efficiency of the administration of the customs than the protests of England. It seems unquestionable that the resources of the Transvaal had induced the Portuguese authorities at Lorenzo Marques to display toward the Boers an attitude which, according to obsolete ideas, was

tion Award.[11] The Portuguese Government, in courteously declining the offer, stated that the amount had already been provided. Great Br

es, Weekly Ed., April 20

ndred men was sent out from Lisbon two days later. The Portuguese frontier was put under a strong guard and all Boer refugees who arrived were summoned before the Governor and warned against carrying on any communications with the Transvaal Government or with the Boer forces still

or. The Governor gave notice to the English commander who had occupied the position evacuated by the Boers that all the Transvaal troops which had surrendered were being guarded and would not be allowed to rejoin the Boer forces still in the field. A number of the refugees agreed to surrender to the British commander as p

nsul at Lorenzo Marques. In spite of the protests of Great Britain and of Portugal as to his unneutral attitude he had been continued in his position. But on December 7, 1900, the strain to which the relations betw

xequatur of Mr. Pott as consul at Lorenzo Marques. This cancellation of the agent's credentials, it was alleged, was deemed necessary on account of irregularities with reference to the transshipment of contraband of war from Lorenzo Marques to the Transvaal. It was further represented to the Dutch Government that the consul under suspension had made an improper use of his position as the acting consular agent for the Free State and the Transvaal; he had taken ad

arn the Portuguese Government that the withdrawal of the consul's exequatur would be considered an unfriendly act. But notwithstanding the warning, the consul's credentials had been cancelled by the Lisbon Government. As a consequence of this act M. Beaufort had requested the Dutch Minister at Lisbon to come to the Hague that he might take part i

n Times, March 1, 1

onsul, acquiesced in the action of the Lisbon Government. But the incident served to demonstrate the fact that the Government at Lisbo

r than any that had been advanced by the English Government. The grounds upon which Portugal granted a privilege of war to one of the belligerents under protest from the other have not been made so clear as the reasons which led to her apparent dereliction of duty at Lorenzo Marques. This incident placed the Portuguese Government in an unfavorable light with regard to its duty in the full

as to the fate of this section of the country should the Boers decide to invade it. Troops had been raised in Rhodesia for the war but were employed outside the co

d five thousand mounted men, some of them to be enlisted in Rhodesia and all of them to be furnished outside of England. Before the end of January, 1899

of Beira. This course necessitated the passage of belligerent troops across two hundred miles of neutral territory controlled by Portugal as territorial sovereign. Beira, situated about four hundred and fifty miles north of Lorenzo Marques, bears nearly the same relation topographically to Br

stination could only be the country of the other belligerent, with whom she was on friendly terms. Portugal had granted to England in 1896 the right of passage for a field force to be used against the natives

ry History of the War in S

ps or the transport of war material over his territory. And it matters not whether a neutral give such permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike."[14] And Lawrence points out that "It is now acknowledged almost universally that a neutral state which permits the passage of any part of a belligerent army through its territory is acting in such a part

rnational Law (190

sked and force used only under extreme necessity, or when the refusal was unjust; Wheaton denied that the right of passage was a "perfect right" and consequently could not be enforced against the will of the neutral; Hall, International Law (1880), §219, poin

e points out that the jurists of the first half of the nineteenth century, with the possible exception of Klüber, were "unanimous in following" Grotius and Vattel, and allowing neutrals to permit belligerents passage as long as they did it

rnational Law in S

17: Ibid

itary History of the Wa

p.

refusal to allow a large quantity of foodstuffs, mules, and wagons to be landed at Beira for the purpose of transportation to Rhodesia. Nevertheless, on April 9, General Sir Frederick Carrington landed at Cape Town under orders to proceed immediately to Beira.[18] He was to use transports put at his disposal

contended that absolute equality of neutrality was not incumbent upon independent States in the performance of their neutral duties. English writers spoke of a "benevolent neutrality" as possible, and cited such cases as that in 1877, when Roumania, before taking an active part in the war against Turkey, permitted Russi

eutrality a benevolent character towards one of the belligerents, which it was asserted she was perfectly entitled to do, a view of the situation which is too obsolete in the light of modern times to need criticism. Alth

the proposed passage of English troops inland from Beira. M. Delcasse said that the Chamber did not feel that the Government should discuss a current question of international law, but he pointed out the fact that France with the other Great Powers had declared her neutrality at the beginning of hostilities. He added, however, that it was not the part of France to guarantee the neutrality of others. One member asserted tha

ugh the proposals may have been dictated by the usual French bias in situations where English int

ritain sought. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, stated that the Transvaal Government had not ordered the Portuguese consul to leave Pretoria. He denied emphatically that any incident whatever had followed Portugal's notification to the Transvaal. When further interrogated, the Minister declared that the English troops had been granted permission to use the railway inland from B

n Times, April 21,

n should march with his forces and reach Pretoria from the north at the same time that General Roberts reached that point from the south.[20] Thus, the end for which the troops were to be used was not to quell an insurrection of the natives in Rhodesia, as was alleged, but to incorporate the expedition into the regular campaign of the war against the Republics. This being the case, the contractual grounds upon which the English Government claimed the right of passage should have been beyond question in order to furnish a justification for Portugal or for England in what is viewed by international law writers of the present day as a distinct breach of neutrality. When the expedition was sent out the statement was made that Engl

Military History,

for her action, the treaty of 1891, but that even upon this interpretation she possessed no real servitude over the territory used by her for warlike purposes. The only claim of justification advanced by the British Government which would appear at all tenable rests upon the statement of Calvo: "It may be that a servitude of public o

nd only one precedent-that of the passage of foreign troops across the Canton of Schaffhausen in 1867 by virtue of a prior treaty between Switzerland and the Grand Duchy of Baden. Obviously no general conc

nection with the rule given above, would appear to deny this conclusion: "During war neutrals may oppose, even by force, all attempts that a belligerent may make to use their territory, and may, in particular, refuse one of the bellige

This quotation is slightly misleading, but ev

ives qu'un belligerant pourrait faire pour user de leur territoire."[23] He also calls attention to the fact that Grotius, Wolff and other authors held that a belligerent, "dont la cause est juste peut, pour aller à la rencontre de son ennemi, traverser avec ses armées le territoire d'une nation neutre."[24] But his statement of the modern rule is conclusive: "Par contre, Heffter, Hautefeuil

23: Calv

24: Ibid

25: Ibid

war between the promiser and a third party."[26] For international purposes the true test is, "Could the power claiming the right of way, or other servitude, enforce its claims during peace time by force, without infringing the sovereignty of the territorial power?" Mr. Baty's opinion is that "if it could, and, if the servitude is consequently a real right," the promisee might use its road in time of war, and the owner of the territory would be "bound to permit the use, without giving offense to the enemy who is prejudiced by the existence of the servitude."[27] But he continues, "If the right of way is merely contractual, then the fulfillment of the promise to permit it must be taken to have become illegal on the outbreak of war and the treaty cannot be invoked to justify the grant of passage." It is asserted that in the former case where a r

nt. Law in Sout

27: Ibid

28: Ibid

territory for the purposes of a belligerent expedition against a State with which it is upon friendly terms. But granting the contention made by Mr. Baty that such a thing as a

able. If England only possessed a right in personam, this right was a valid one in times of peace and for the purposes stipulated by the terms of the treaty, but became void in time of war, and, being purely personal in character, depended upon the promise of th

by any possibility apply to the ca

and Foreign State Pape

ritain and Portugal, d

ountries in Africa, si

s exchanged at Lon

esi, and through the districts adjoining the left bank of the river situated above the confluence of the Shiré, and those adjoining the right bank of

30: Ibid

ersons and goods of every description over the water-ways of the Zambezi, the Shiré, the Pungwe, the Busi, the Limpopo, the Sabi

and Foreign State Pa

Portugal agrees to grant absolute freedom of passage between the British sphere of influence and Pungwe Bay for all merc

id., pp. 39-40.

e. It is admitted by Mr. Baty that Article 12 is inapplicable to any routes other than the water-ways specified and the land routes and portages auxiliary to them. It is also admitted

rnational Law in S

e created by this treaty. Upon the supposition that if the right still existed in times of war it must have been

34: Ibid

ing to war with Portugal," But he says this interpretation is always "subject to the consideration, that the terms of the treaty do not seem to contemplate the use of the road as a military road at all," a conclusion which would seem to settle the question, and deny that any shred of justification existed for the use to which neutral territory was put in time of war. But Mr. Baty in the same breath says: "There can be such a thing as a military road across n

rnational Law in S

36: Ibid

ret," he says, "that the British Government should have found it necessary to place a somewhat strained interpretation on a

37: Ibid

out that, "When the language of a treaty, taken in the ordinary meaning of the words, yields a plain and reasonable sense, it must be taken to be read in that sense."[38] The only reasonable sense in which the stipulations of the British-Portuguese treaty of 1891 could be taken was that of a purely commercial agreement. The spirit of the treaty, the general sense and the context of the disputed terms all seem to indicate that the instrument cons

ternational Law

all, Int. Law (

oops in time of war. Nor would there seem to be any plausibility in the claim that certain mutual explanations exchanged between the two Gove

o English territory and vice versa, the British Government has just made a formal demand for all troops and material of war to be sent through Beira to the English hinterland. The Portuguese Government cannot refuse the demand and must fulfill a convention depending on reciprocity, a convention which was settled long before the present state of war had been foreseen. This agreement cannot be regarded as a superfluous support of one of the belligerent part

itary History of the Wa

366,

d out that this being the case the treaty could not be applied even if it granted the right contended for by England. And even stronger was the Transvaal argument that in no case after war had begun could such a treaty be applie

1: Ibid., p

gh neutral Portuguese territory against a nation at peace with Portugal was based upon a flagrant misreading of a purely commercial treaty. The act