also disappeared were doomed to a severe disappointment. They had not reckoned with a South American republic on the verge of bankruptcy and suddenly presented with a glorious

as they could obtain; and, secondly, it was necessary to conclude a treaty with Colombia, securing to the United States on satisfac

d by the Report of the Third Canal Commission, issued in December 1900. Probably the members of the commission were convinced of the advantages of the Panama route and the desirability of continuing the work of the French engineers. But they were shrewd people. They dwelt in their report on the improbability that the New Panama

on the scrap-heap. The company estimated the value of its property at $109,141,500, a price which the commission, representing the American government, declined to look at. The commission thought $40,000,000 quite enough for the property, and so completely

n seaboard of the States would be longer. They argued that Panama was unfavourable to sailing vessels on account of the prevailing calms on that coast; that it would be easier to deal with Costa Rica and Nicaragua than with Colombia; and that Nicaragua was "the traditional American route" as compared with the Frenchified Pana

rom Colombia the perpetual control of a strip of land, not less than six miles wide, in which the canal should run; and then to proceed with the work. But if it should prove impossible to come to terms with Colombia and the New Panama Company, then

hem. The situation was interesting. The Republic of Colombia was extremely "hard up." Its currency was debased, its treasury empty, its debt rapidly increasing through a large annual deficit. The government, if one may so express it, of the Colombian Republic was therefore not likely to overlook the chance of "making a bit" out of the

he United States. Sanitary and police services were to be maintained by both governments jointly. Colombia was to police the zone, with the help of the United States if necessary. But the business terms were chiefly interesting

ould not be carried away would revert to the Colombian government. Only defer any agreement with the United States till then, and the $40,000,000 to be paid to the New Panama Canal Company by the

ad to be ratified by the Congress of Colombia, and the president of that state took care that a congress should be elected which would do no such thing. Meantime all kinds of influences, secret and open, were at work. The German "colonial party" had become interested in the question, and had conceived the possibility of Germany, rather than the United States, su

nothing to sell, because the franchise and possessions of the company would be forfeited to the Colombian government at that date. It would be better to sell on the best terms they could obtain to Germany or anybody else before the fatal day arrived. Meantime the United States brought every force of argument and menace to bear on the Colombian government. S

William Nelson Cromwell, who had done his utmost to promote the agreement, had the utmost difficulty in keeping his clients to their compact with the United States. He made a hurried trip to Paris, where he said something which had the desired effect. There is no reason

nch concession had lapsed. This recommendation was not acted upon by the Colombian Senate, nor yet were any steps taken towards the negotiation of a new treaty. The American government gave a generous interpretation to the "reasonable time" specified in the Spooner Bill, and kept on waiting in the hope that the Colombian Congress would still change its mind and ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty, whose terms, as we have seen, were liberal to the Colombian

d the United States suddenly and without further difficulty obtained all they wanted of the isthmus. And Colombia? She lost every stick and stone of the canal which was to have been hers in Octobe