French Government and handed to M. Thiers by

fice, Augu

i

which Her Majesty's Government desire to make upon the Memorandum which was handed to me on July 24 by the French Ambassador to this C

d the balance of power in Europe. The Memorandum of July 17 was conceived in a spirit no less friendly towards France, and Her Majesty's Government is equa

contained in the French Memorandum stating that France wishes to act in co

of action; Her Majesty's Government though not bound to defer, as proof of this desire, to the other proposals which have been made from time to time to the French Government, and to which reference has been made in the French Memorandum, can unhesitatingly declare that no European Power can be less influenced than Great Britain by private views or by any desire and hope of exclusive advantage whi

despatch from Marshal Soult, under date July 17, 1839. This despatch was officially communicated to the four Powers. It has also of

ynasty as essential to the balance of power and as a guarantee for the preservation of peace; in a despatch from Marshal Soult the French Government has

ted. The only difference existing between the two Governments is a difference of opinion concerning the means regarded as most advi

Syria, as the military key of Asiatic Turkey, and that if Mehemet Ali were to continue to occupy this province as well as Egypt, he would be able at any time to threaten Bagdad from the south, Diarbekir and Erzeroum from the east, Koniah, Brousse, and Constantinople from the north; and that the same ambitious spirit which has driven Mehemet Ali under other conditions to revolt against his Sovereign, would soon induce him hereafter to take up arms for further invasions; and that for this purpose he would always maintain a large army on foot; that the Sultan, on the other hand, would be contin

would carry out an intention which he has frankly avowed to the Powers of Europe that he would never abandon, and would declare himself independent. Such a declaration upon his part would incontestably amount to a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and, what is more, this dismember

us to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire and to maintain the independence of the

rovince, the military and financial resources of which would then be of greater use to him than if they were in the hands of the Sultan himself; that every confidence might be placed in the sincerity with which Mehemet Ali had renounced all ulterior views, and in his protestations of faithful devotio

would be dangerous; that these operations by sea would not expel the Egyptians from Syria and would merely rouse Mehemet Ali to begin an attack upon Constantinople; while the measures which might be taken in such a case to defend the capital and in part

ge number of well-administered provinces are from their capitals in other States and can be as well governed from Constantinople as from Alexandria; that it is impossible for the resources of this province to be of any use to the Sultan in the hands of a governor who might turn them against his master at any moment and that they would be more useful if they were in the hands or at the disposal of the Sultan himself; that

ts opinion and refused to take part in an arrang

in her attitude and that consequently the resolution which England communicated to her in the Memorandum of July 17, doubtless in the name of the four Powers,

the power delegated to Mehemet Ali to Egypt alone and would re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan throughout Syria, both in Candia and in all the towns of the Holy Land; thus interposing the desert between the direct power of the Sultan and the province of which the a

Sultan and Mehemet Ali could possibly be; that although the French Government thus refused to agree to England's plan, during the long space of time which had subsequently elapsed, it had not proposed any plan of its own. Further, in September 1839, Comte Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London, proposed to draw a line from the east to the west of the sea, nearly from Beyrout to the desert near Damascus and to declare

d not accede to it. I observed that it seemed inconsistent on the part of France to express her willingness to force Mehemet Ali to agree to an arrangement which would obviously be incomplete and inadequate to secure the proposed

hemet Ali, were founded upon considerations of domestic government, and that these objections would be removed if the French Government was enabled

become a hereditary governor of Egypt and of all Syria, and governor for life of Candia, surrendering nothing but the district of Adana and Arabia. The French Government did not say a

nt state of things, the more so as the gift to Mehemet Ali of the legal and hereditary title to a third of the Otto

he Sultan to grant to Mehemet Ali, apart from the pashalik of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, to be bounded on the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the southern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias, and by a line from this point to the Gulf of Akaba, provided that

h full details and information have been sent to the French Government. Negotiations with France were suspended for a time at t

oncluded with the other four Powers, and we submitted to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposal for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. One objection put forward by the Fren

myself the next day. M. Guizot told me he would inform his Government of this proposal and of the facts which I had laid before him, and that he would let me know the answer as soon as he had received it. A short time afterwards the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia informed me that they had every reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon the proposal for themselves, had sent it to Alexandria to learn the decision of Mehemet Ali; that the four Powers who had undertaken the business were thus confronted, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali; that, apart from the inevitable delay, this was an action which their respective courts had never intended to take and one to which they would never consent; and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing position. I agreed with them that their objections were jus

ity of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; all five had declared that they would use all their influence to maintain this integrity and this independence; but France, on the one hand, insisted that the best means to secure this result was to abandon the Sultan to the mercies of Mehemet Ali and to advise him to submit to the conditions which Mehemet migh

use of force. It only remained then for the four Great Powers to adopt as an alternative the principle laid down by France, which consisted in the complete submission of the Sultan to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or to act upon their principles and force Mehemet Ali to accept an arran

the general and permanent interests of Europe. But what they failed to secure, and what they esteemed, was the co-operation of France in the maintenance of peace to secure the eventual safety of Europe and the practical execution of the principles to which the five Powers had declared their agreement. They desired the co-oper

rtaken by the five Powers, and that it was incompatible with the principles which they had wisely emphasised, the four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice demanded of them, and buy the help of France at so high a pri

October 1 last, I had pointed out to the French Ambassador that our desire to remain united with France must have a limit, that we were anxious to go forward with France but not disposed to come to a stand

; that France would be a passive spectator of events; that after a year or eighteen months of useless efforts we should recognise that we had been mistaken, and that we should then apply to France; that this Power would then co-operate to set

e four Powers: a principle which consisted in the idea that no settlement of the difficulties between the Sultan and his subject could take place except under conditions which the subject could accept voluntarily, or, in other terms, could dictate; hence, the French Government must have been prepared to see the four Powers determined to act apart from France; and when

Sultan by a Collective Note, which was handed to the Porte on July 27, 1839, by their representatives at Constantinople, that their unanimity was complete, and these representatives requested the Porte to refrain from any direct negotiations with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha without the concurrence of the five Powers. However, Her Majesty's Government has good reason to believe that during the la

ost urgent manner by arguments which seemed conclusive to Her Majesty's Government. From the very outset of the negotiations, the declarations of principle made by the French Government induced Her Majesty's Government to believe that the two Governments had only to agree upon the means of carrying out their common principles. If the intentions of the French Government concerning these means differed from the views of England even at the outset of the negotiations,

an entirely different policy, it would be unreasonable to require the four to abandon, in deference to the fifth, opinions to which t

refused to admit that the arrangement which the four Powers wished to introduce between the Sultan and the Pasha would be the best solution if it could be secured, and as again the objections of France referred not to the object proposed but to the means by whic

disagreement between France and her allies, nor will there be any obstacle to prevent France from undertaking with the other Powers such engagements for the future as may seem necessa

of its own, has refused to participate in the coercive measures to be employed against Mehemet Ali, this Government certainly cannot object to the employment of such measures with the object of inducing the Pasha to submit to the arrangements which are to be placed before him, and it is obvious t

terested. They are not seeking to gather any advantage for themselves or to establish any exclusive sphere of influence, or to acquire any territory, and the object which they have in vie

ally to M. Thiers a

m,

d)Palm

nal des Débats